Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law by Blum, Gabriella
 
Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International
Law
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the
Architecture of International Law, 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. 323 (2008).
Published Version http://www.harvardilj.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/HILJ_49-2_Blum.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:09:28 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10880577
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-MAY-08 13:29
VOLUME 49, NUMBER 2, SUMMER 2008
Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture
of International Law
Gabriella Blum*
This paper studies the different roles, impact, and operation of bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties
as structures within the architecture of international law. I observe that the preference for bilateralism or
multilateralism in international lawmaking is often determined not by an informed choice but by an
instinctive association of political schools or bureaucratic affiliations with different forms of international
regulation. This association, however, is not always founded on a just appreciation of the workings of
either form in various contexts or of the way in which the two interact with each other. I set out to offer a
framework for such an appreciation and assess the workings of multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties
along three dimensions: the contribution of the respective instruments to the advancement of an interna-
tional rule of law; the operation of the regime in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance; and
the democratic legitimacy of the making of each regime. I demonstrate that ideologies and values that seem
to be almost blindly associated with one type of regulation may be actually better served, in some cases, by
using the other type. Ultimately, this paper attempts to chart a course for more theoretical and empirical
forays into the questions of why states join particular types of treaties and how these different types of
treaties, or a combination of them, promote or obstruct the attainment of various goals within the architec-
ture of international law.
“Multilateralism is our shared secular religion. Despite all of our disap-
pointments with its functioning, we still worship at the shrine of
global institutions like the UN.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The war on terror, the invasion of Iraq, the genocide in Darfur, concerns
about global warming, and the economic and social effects of international
trade are at the heart of debates among international lawyers, political scien-
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tists, and policymakers regarding approaches to international law. A sense of
heightened political stakes worldwide has widened the divide between uni-
versalists, who aspire for an interconnected “one world, one law” interna-
tional order, and unilateralists, who value independence, flexibility, and
freedom of action. Instinctively, this divide generally corresponds to domes-
tic political affiliations of left and right; the left is drawn to the vision of an
interlacing universe, in which concern for the other is paramount, and the
right naturally tends toward unilateralism, which is considered a byword for
strength and patriotism.
For universalists, true universalization of international law requires the
harnessing of participants, constituencies, stakeholders, sources, and influ-
ences into modern international legal processes. In contrast, the unilateralist,
or “sovereigntist,” camp2 maintains that the universalization of interna-
tional law poses a threat to sovereignty and national interests.
The two political camps display a strong, instinctive preference for one of
two forms of treaty-making that they perceive as best serving their ideolo-
gies. In essence, universalists believe that multilateral treaties (“MLTs”) and
the international organizations (“IOs”) associated with them are both the
cause and the effect of a transition from anachronistic notions of sovereignty
and self-aggrandizement—still epitomized in bilateral, power-based pacts—
to a more enlightened international society.3 This society has been described
as a “community,”4 a “global village,”5 a “neighborhood,”6 a “family of
nations,”7 or even—in its most exaggerated portrayal—as a precursor to an
inspired vision of global “love.”8 MLTs and IOs promote an international
rule of law and serve as the building blocks of an international constitution.
2. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 9.
3. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (2d
ed. 1997);H ERMANN M OSLER, THE I NTERNATIONAL S OCIETY AS A L EGAL C OMMUNITY (Sijthoff &
Noordhoff 1980) (1974). But see Stephen Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 91, 103 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF LAW], for a critique on this
point. The first introduction of the idea of an “international society” of states is ascribed to Emerich de
Vattel. See EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE: APPLIQU´ ES ` A
LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (1758).
4. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN I NTERNATIONAL L AW AND I NSTITUTIONS 5–6 (1995); see
generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
But see Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International Community, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 961, 988–91 (2002)
(discussing what he terms the “rhetorical and imagined [international] communities”); Herman Mosler,
International Legal Community, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 7th Installment 1984).
5. See generally RICHARD A. FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL V ILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1998).
6. See generally SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL & INGVAR CARLSSON, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995).
7. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations Organization,
¶ 14 (Oct. 5, 1995), available at http://vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1995/october/docu-
ments/hf_jp-ii-spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html.
8. PHILIP ALLOTT,E UNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW W ORLD 404 (2001).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 3 20-MAY-08 13:29
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They are best equipped to solve global problems effectively and efficiently
and their processes benefit from a high degree of professionalism and demo-
cratic legitimacy. Essentially hoping to reproduce a domestic law and gov-
ernance system in the international sphere, universalists believe that
multilateralism is the preferred strategy for regulating international behav-
ior and, as a matter of principle, the world needs much more of it.9
Unilateralists, on the other hand, are deeply suspicious of inclusive ac-
cords. Particularly within the United States, this school of thought stresses
the threat multilateralism poses to national autonomy and freedom of ac-
tion.10 Both descriptively and normatively, unilateralists argue, multilateral-
ism is useful only in the context of alliances created to advance traditional
military, economic, or other national interests and becomes dangerous when
it imposes meaningful restraints on states’ conduct or transfers any real deci-
sionmaking power to international governance. Even when challenges are
global, universalists assert that individual state sovereignty and responsibil-
ity are still the most reliable defenses.11 Consequently, unilateralists prefer,
if anything, treaties with limited participation, allowing their governments
to pick and choose partners and obligations. The narrowest and most limited
form of treaty-making is through bilateral treaties (“BLTs”).
The two political camps display a strong preference for the form of inter-
national regulation that they perceive as best serving their ideologies: in the
former case, a near-blanket preference for multilateralism (ideally, universal-
ism) expressed by multilateral treaties and, in the latter case, a deep suspi-
cion of it and a default preference for, at most, bilateral treaties.
In this Article, however, I argue that the instinctive beeline inclination
for either form of regulation—MLTs or BLTs—presupposes much about
their operation and about what may be gained from them. I argue that the
supposed benefits of MLTs are often not as great as advertised or expected,
and the effects of BLTs are not necessarily as limited as universalists fear or
unilateralists hope.
My point of departure is the account favored by mainstream international
legal scholarship of the advantages of multilateralism. But this is a method-
ological choice (which I explain below); my argument itself is non-hierarchi-
cal. I do not advocate bilateralism over multilateralism. Rather, I argue that
a much deeper foray into the workings of both structures of regulation, as
9. See, e.g., PHILIP A LLOTT, TOWARDS THE I NTERNATIONAL R ULE OF L AW: ESSAYS IN I NTEGRATED
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 453–63 (2005) [hereinafter ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF
LAW]; CHRISTOPHER W EERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING I NTERNATIONAL L AW 37, 102 (2004); see also
PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 61–62 (2002) [here-
inafter ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS].
10. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?,1   CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 213–14
(2000). Most American unilateralists also claim that ceding such autonomy would violate the U.S. Con-
stitution. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, International Law and the State of the Constitution: The Twenty-
Fifth Annual National Student Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public Policy – 2006: Executive Power v.
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 76–88, 113 (2006).
11. Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 876–82 (2004).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 4 20-MAY-08 13:29
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well as of the myriad ways in which the structures interact with one another,
is vital if we wish to gain a well-rounded view of the best architecture for
international lawmaking. The knee-jerk association of political ideologies
with one vehicle of international regulation runs the risk of overlooking
potential advantages of the other. In fact, I show that ideologies and values
that are commonly associated with one type of regulation may, in some
cases, actually be better served by using the other.
The bond between ideology and methodology is particularly crucial in the
context of treaty-making because of the clear and growing trend in state
practice to favor more treaty-making of all kinds.12 The United Nations
Treaty Series (“UNTS”) currently lists about 3500 universal MLTs (those
that aspire to govern all states) and 50,000 BLTs.13 For various technical
reasons that have to do with treaty registration, the number of listed MLTs
is probably inflated. The number of listed BLTs, on the other hand, proba-
bly reflects only a third of the actual number of those in existence. This
means that to the observer of the world of treaty-making, the conclusion and
workings of BLTs remain largely under the radar, overshadowed by the
proliferation of MLTs.
This state of affairs is mirrored in a gap in existing international law
literature. Although both international law and international relations
scholars have studied various aspects of treaty design, existing literature fails
to offer a comprehensive and systematic analysis comparing the pros and
cons of bilateral versus multilateral legal instruments. In particular, even
though bilateral instruments govern a considerable portion of international
interaction, they have been given far less attention by mainstream interna-
tional law scholars than universal or even regional agreements,14 with the
notable exceptions of the Cold War disarmament agreements,15 peace agree-
12. See G. John Ikenberry, Is American Multilateralism in Decline?,1   PERSP. ON POLS. 533, 537 (2003).
13. Telephone interview with Bradford Roth, U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section (Sept.
2007). In a comparison between data on BLTs in force, provided by the ministries of foreign affairs of ten
countries, with that of the UNTS, substantial discrepancies were found. A search via the UNTS Ad-
vanced Search Page resulted, in some cases, in only a fraction of the BLTs reported by the countries
themselves. For example, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade lists 2,676
bilateral treaties (both with states and IOs), see http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/TreatyResult.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2008), while the UNTS lists only 1,471. France reports 4,773 bilateral treaties (with states
and IOs), see http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/pacte/webext/bilat/sf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008),
while the UNTS lists only 2,983. In other cases, such as for Australia, the UNTS registry reported a
higher number of BLTs than the country itself did (999 vs. 830), as the UNTS included treaties no
longer in force. See http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/Treaties.nsf/WebView?OpenForm&Seq=
12 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
14. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 463, 470 (2006).
15. On bilateral arms-control agreements, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 99–100 (1995). See
generally Kenneth W. Abbott, “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and
Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1993).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-MAY-08 13:29
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ments,16 and, more recently, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).17 The
lack of mainstream scholarly interest in the workings of BLTs is all the more
surprising given the absence of systematic empirical data comparing the ef-
fects of MLTs with those of other possible forms of international accords and
analyzing how different types of international agreements operate in
concert.18
It may well be that there is a good reason why MLTs have captured more
scholarly attention. MLTs are instinctively, though often wrongly, associ-
ated with “higher politics”—security, human rights, environment, and
trade. In addition, a single MLT applies to a larger number of international
actors, is often complemented by IOs and international bureaucracies, and is
likelier to include some kind of dispute-resolution mechanism.19 In short,
MLTs resemble “real law.” BLTs, on the other hand, are less glamorous. For
the most part, they are perceived as necessary stopgap measures in the ab-
sence of universal norms or as a means of translating existing universal rules
into specific bilateral contexts. BLTs are the international parallel of domes-
tic contracts concluded in the shadow of domestic laws.
Doctrinally, however, BLTs are every bit as much “international law” as
MLTs. Both types of treaties are mere structures in a complex architecture of
legal instruments that make up international law. Neglecting the role of
BLTs in this complex architecture impairs our descriptive acumen—in that
it leaves us with only a partial account of international lawmaking—as well
as our normative agenda—in that critical tools for promoting desired goals
are missing. Because the majority of literature focuses on the advantages of
MLTs, I challenge the association between ideological affiliations and treaty
type through a critique of existing accounts of MLTs. In so doing, I hope to
revive interest in the workings of BLTs by emphasizing the strengths and
weaknesses of both MLTs and BLTs.
My assessment tracks three popularly offered, broad sets of criteria:
16. See generally ENDING CIVIL W ARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS (Stephen John
Stedman, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens eds., 2002); Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their
Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373 (2006).
17. See generally Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffu-
sion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L O RG. 811 (2006); Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand
Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005).
18. In response to arguments made by international relations institutionalist scholars about multilat-
eral cooperation in the framework of MLTs and IOs, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner note, “we have
sympathy for this analysis, which rests on standard rational choice models, but we think that the propo-
nents of this view have made claims on its behalf that are not always supported by the evidence.” JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (2005) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH
& POSNER, LIMITS].
19. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 319–20 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, The Cost of Credibility].\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 6 20-MAY-08 13:29
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1) Promotion of the rule of law and the constitution of an international
society as measured through uniformity of law and equality before the
law;
2) Compliance, effectiveness, and efficiency; and
3) Democratic legitimacy and professionalism in treaty-making.
My assessment in each category begins with existing accounts, both explicit
and implicit, of how these criteria are best realized through MLTs. I then
challenge such accounts not because they are necessarily false, but rather
because they confuse normative aspirations with real-world performance.
Next, I suggest a more nuanced view of both MLTs and BLTs under each set
of considerations. When compliance, effectiveness, and efficiency are consid-
ered, I show that generic distinctions among different types of regimes—
particularly, those regimes regulating coordination or cooperation activities,
dealing with club goods or universal goods, and projecting externalities onto
others—make a conscious and informed choice between MLTs and BLTs
particularly crucial. Finally, I demonstrate how, far from an either/or choice,
the two forms of regulation can complement, enrich, and reinforce one
another.
Again, my assessment of the two regimes is not normative. I remain ag-
nostic as to the choice between competing benefits or costs of each type of
regulation. The words “cost” or “benefit” naturally beg the question, “for
whom?,” and I remain conscious of the fact that costs and benefits are per-
ceived and determined differently by the White House, the U.N. Secreta-
riat, Greenpeace, or the Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My wish is to
set straight prevalent claims regarding the costs and benefits of MLTs and
BLTs and thereby chart a new direction for future theoretical and empirical
testing of how these treaty forms operate as components of the architecture
of international law.
The Article is structured as follows: Part II offers terminological clarifica-
tions and defines the scope of this work. Part III offers an assessment of
BLTs and MLTs alongside considerations of rule of law and the constitution
of the international society. Part IV offers an assessment of compliance, ef-
fectiveness, and efficiency of both MLTs and BLTs. Part V offers an assess-
ment alongside considerations of professionalism and democratic legitimacy
in the treaty-forming process. Part VI explores the different ways in which
BLTs and MLTs interact, and could interact, as components in the architec-
ture of international law. Part VII summarizes the key points of this study
and suggests avenues for further empirical research.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE
For the sake of methodological coherence and manageability, I limit this
study to formal treaties that meet the Vienna Convention on the Law of\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 7 20-MAY-08 13:29
2008 / Bilateralism, Multilateralism & Architecture of International Law 329
Treaties20 (“VCLT”) definitions. A treaty, under the VCLT, is “an interna-
tional agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law . . . whatever its particular designation.”21 This standard
definition of a treaty makes no distinctions among treaties on the basis of
form, content, purpose, or the number of parties concluding them.22 It also
makes no explicit differentiation between “law-making” treaties and, essen-
tially, contractual treaties.23 For purposes of the VCLT, therefore, there is no
material difference between bilateral or multilateral treaties, whatever their
aims may be.24 Nor is there any material difference or normative hierarchy
between bilateral and multilateral treaties for the purposes of adjudication
before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). In cases of conflict under
either form of treaty, the Court would apply general principles of interpreta-
tion, such as the “last in time” rule or the “more specific” rule.25
Although there is no material, nor normative difference between these
two types of treaties, I use BLTs and MLTs as two opposite and extreme
forms of treaties. BLTs are treaties concluded between two states and are not
open to the entire international community. MLTs will here be used as
shorthand for multilateral treaties that invite the international community
at large to join them, and thus, at least in aspiration, aim at universal partic-
ipation. I consider such universal treaties as the epitome of the multilateral
effort.
I accord little attention to regional or other limited multilateral treaties
(“LMLTs”), which are treaties concluded among specific states and which do
not aspire to become universal. In effect, LMLTs represent the middle
ground between BLTs and MLTs. LMLTs interact with both BLTs and
MLTs and, in relation to each one, serve as a modified version of the other.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
21. Id. art. 2, para. 1(a).
22. In its early codification phases, the International Law Commission attempted to specifically define
“general multilateral treaty” as a specific multilateral treaty that concerns general norms of international
law or that deals with matters of general interest to the international community at large. SHABTAI
ROSENNE,T HE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 355 (2004). This effort was rendered
moot by the VCLT. For more on the typology of bilateral and collective obligations, see generally Joost
Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Na-
ture?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2003).
23. For the effects of bilateral and multilateral types of obligations within multilateral frameworks on
state responsibility and enforcement by third parties, see generally Linos Alexander Sicilianos, The Classi-
fication of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1127 (2002).  Note that this distinction is often debatable, as in the case of international trade.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 22, at 928–36 (arguing that although WTO obligations are essentially bilateral R
obligations and not collective, some may indeed be regarded as collective).
24. Where the number of parties is material to the arrangement, as in the case of reservations or
exiting treaties, provisions apply mutatis mutandis.  Regardless of the treaty form, some VLCT rules are
affected by the object and purpose of the treaty.  For most purposes, however, including conclusion, entry
into force, compliance, and resolution of treaty conflicts, the two forms are generally on an equal par.  See
VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 20, 40, 41, 58. R
25. For rules of interpretation and other methods of resolving conflicts between treaties, see Christo-
pher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573, 587–647 (2005).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 8 20-MAY-08 13:29
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Although the relationship between MLTs and LMLTs has been studied to
some extent (mostly in the context of regional and international trade),26 less
notice has been paid to the interplay between LMLTs and BLTs (mostly in
the limited context of the effects of regional arrangements on bilateral agree-
ments concluded between countries in a region). I hope additional studies of
these two relationships will benefit from and be informed by the assessment
of MLTs and BLTs I offer here.
In limiting this study to formal treaties, I also leave out “soft law” mech-
anisms. Variably defined,27 these mechanisms are mostly understood to
mean nonbinding instruments designed as declarations of intentions, desired
goals, shared values, or general aspirations.28 In the universalist camp, the
urge to promulgate more universal norms has been evident in the drafting
and conclusion of hundreds of multilateral soft-law instruments, including
declarations, resolutions, pledges, codes of conduct, and other instruments. I
similarly ignore bilateral soft-law instruments.
I occasionally address multilateral customary international law not codi-
fied in treaties. Despite being the one source of law that can actually claim
to be universal in coverage (save the limited exception of persistent objec-
tors), customary international law has been the subject of heated debate
among international law scholars, who seem to disagree on almost every
feature of it: how one “finds” custom, how it is created and changed over
time, which states actually participate in its making, and the extent to
which it should prevail over conflicting domestic law.29 Mindful of these
26. See generally THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A C OMMON L AW OF I NTERNA-
TIONAL T RADE? (Joseph H. H. Weiler ed., 2000); Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions:
The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 917 (1992);
Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
27. On the impact of nonbinding norms in four fields of international law—human rights, environ-
ment, trade and finance, and arms control—and their uncertain definitions, see generally COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); on the lack of a single definition, see Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 15 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997); on the different motiva-
tions behind the choice to devise multilateral arrangements in forms other than binding treaties, see Kal
Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 587 (2005) [hereinafter
Raustiala, Form and Substance].
28. Kal Raustiala suggests the distinction between “contracts” (legally binding) and “pledges” (le-
gally nonbinding).  Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 27, at 581. Friedrich Kratchovil and Chris- R
tine Chinkin both advance a distinction between specific obligations, which are “hard,” and those that
are more abstract, which are “soft.” FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL,R ULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON
THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS 203 (1989); Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in Interna-
tional Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989). Others have observed that, even though not legally
binding as such, soft law instruments do give rise to legitimate expectations regarding the implementa-
tion of legal relations even if they themselves do not create such relations. See, e.g., ALLOTT, THE HEALTH
OF NATIONS, supra note 9, at 308. R
29. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, LIMITS, supra note 18, at 23–44 (2005). See generally MICHAEL BYERS, R
CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1999).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 9 20-MAY-08 13:29
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debates, I rely on mainstream doctrinal understandings of the development
and operation of customary law.
Finally, I leave out a systematic analysis of less formal structures of inter-
national cooperation, such as transnational networks of judges, bureaucrats,
parliamentarians, and other professionals who, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has
demonstrated, create de facto forms of global governance.30 More broadly,
these less formal structures include the full spectrum of “interstitial” and
implicit rules and norms that, some argue, are an inherent part of interna-
tional law.31 Nor do I include an analysis of the workings of ad hoc negotia-
tion and diplomatic efforts, either within or outside of formal structures.
Indeed, one may well question the fundamental wisdom of regulating an
increasing portion of international affairs through formal legal means and
the consequent depletion in status and aspiration of diplomacy, ad hoc nego-
tiated solutions, or other less formal mechanisms.32 It is a question I do not
intend to answer here, although I allude to it at some points in my
argument.
All these instruments that I leave out of the discussion are crucial compo-
nents in the architecture of international law, at times even more important
than the formal treaties I address here. Omitting them is done out of neces-
sity, not oversight.
III. AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
“The expansion of the rule of law in international relations has been
the foundation of much of the political, social and economic progress
achieved in recent years. Undoubtedly, it will facilitate further progress
in the new Millennium.”33
Universalism is often associated with the aspiration for an “international
rule of law.”34 International lawyers and diplomats characterize the “rule of
30. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW W ORLD ORDER (2004).
31. See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation
Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 207, 219–21. R
32. Such an argument has been advanced by David Kennedy, who challenges the entire effort of
promoting humanitarian goals (in which he includes human rights, humanitarian protection, environ-
mental protection, and poverty alleviation) through legal instruments. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK
SIDE OF VIRTUE 3–36 (2004). On the impossibility of international law to resolve inherent political and
normative disputes, see generally MARTTI K OSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).  See also
Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187,
213–14 (2006), for an argument on the diminishing of space for political engagement due to global
administrative arrangements.
33. Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen., to Heads of States (May 15, 2000), available at http://
www.un.org/millennium/law/sgletter.htm.
34. Robert Cooper, How Shall We Answer Robert Kagan,4   INTERNATIONALE P OLITIK (Transatlantic
Ed.) 19, 22 (2003) (F.R.G.) (“Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value. We value
pluralism and the rule of law domestically; it is difficult for democratic societies—including in the\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 10 20-MAY-08 13:29
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law” as the single most important goal of the international system, one
upon which all other goals—peace, prosperity, and effective international
cooperation—depend. In its simplest iteration, “rule of law” means that
international law should guide the conduct of states: it is the final arbiter of
the exercise of power and states must comply with its provisions.35
To assess the degree to which MLTs and BLTs actually contribute to the
ideal of the rule of law, it is necessary to recall for a moment how the rule of
law evolved as an ideal. Much of the multilateral effort that began in the
second half of the nineteenth century was directed toward international,
multinational legislation—reasonably analogous to national legislation—
that would induce a shift away from interest-based, limited alliances and
toward uniform regulation of the behavior of all states at the expense of their
sovereignty. It was thought that the ideals of democracy and liberalism,
alongside economic and technological growth, would be promoted best
through a liberal and pacifying international legal system. Such interstate
law would mitigate the naturally anarchic nature of the international sys-
tem, binding states together and curbing the rogue tendencies of individual
states. In effect, it was hoped, such a legal system would eventually replace
armed force as the ordering principle of the international system.
In this spirit, the U.N. Charter, in many ways regarded as the “constitu-
tional” document for the international legal system, states in its preamble
that its members are determined “to establish conditions under which jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained.”36 In article 1, the Charter stipulates
that the organization’s goals are “to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.”37
But the envisioned international rule of law was not meant only to replace
power as the arbiter of disputes. In its ideal form, international rule of law
held the promise of transcending its instrumental role and standing as a
value in itself. In its most extreme triumphant form, a universal rule of law
not only would serve as an organizing principle of international relations
that regulated the behavior of states, but also would constitute the quintes-
sential international society. In Philip Allott’s vision, “[t]he time has come
U.S.—to escape from the idea that they are desirable internationally as well.”).  See also Jos´ e E. Alvarez,
International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324, 326 (2006), for an account of institu-
tions that aspire to global participation as attempting “to subject the totality of international relations to
the rule of law” and “inspire conceptions of a new form of jus gentium.”
35. See Hans Corell, The Visible College of International Lawyers: “Towards the Rule of Law in International
Relations,” 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 262, 263 (2001) (Mr. Corell was at the time under-secretary-
general for legal affairs and the legal counsel of the United Nations.); IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 1–17, 213–28 (1998).
36. U.N. Charter pmbl.
37. See U.N. Charter chap. VI, for further information on the pacific settlement of disputes.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 11 20-MAY-08 13:29
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to actualise an ancient potentiality—the history of the self-constituting of
the society of all-humanity, the society of all human societies. It will be the
beginning of universal human history.”38
To achieve this goal, Andrew Hurrell explains, international law needed
to transform its pluralist vision into a solidarist one.39 The former, con-
structed within the classical European state system, was premised on the
mutual recognition of sovereignty, difference, and deference. The latter,
much more ambitious in scope and content, sought to abolish fragmenta-
tion. A solidarist version of international law would create and stabilize not
only an international system of sovereign states, but also a true transnational
society or, in the words of Immanuel Kant, an omnilateral society that em-
bodies “the act of all the wills of a community together (lege).”40
It is with this ideal in mind that MLTs must be judged. To establish a
society through law, law must be multilateral in its making and application.
To create an omnilateral or solidarist society through an international rule of
law, the law must project a special normative pull. On both of these counts,
MLTs instinctively seem a more fitting instrument than more limited
partnerships.
The following sections weigh the degree to which MLTs do in fact pro-
mote the ideals embedded in an international rule of law, as their designers
hope, and demonstrate how the present aggregate of rules and practices re-
garding treaty-making and participation render the goals impossible to at-
tain in reality. It is in part this impossibility that should draw our attention
to BLTs as alternatives.
One question that exceeds the scope of this paper is whether or not the
ideal of an international rule of law, one that unifies the international system
to the point of homogeneity, is in fact desirable. Martti Koskenniemi, for
instance, argues that
[o]ur inherited ideal of a World Order based on the Rule of Law thinly
hides from sight the fact that social conflict must still be solved by
political means and that even though there may exist a common legal
rhetoric among international lawyers, that rhetoric must, for reasons in-
ternal to the ideal itself, rely on essentially contested—political—princi-
ples to justify outcomes to international disputes.41
If Koskenniemi is correct, then increased legalization of international rela-
tions is at best inconsequential and at worse harmful. Notwithstanding this
38. ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW, supra note 9, at 465. R
39. Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 327, 336. R
40. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 84 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796), cited in
Benedict Kingsbury, Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging
Global Administrative Law, 104 J. INT’L L. & DIPL. 98, 99 (2005).
41. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law,1   EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 7 (1990); see also
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 32. R\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 12 20-MAY-08 13:29
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skepticism, I proceed under the assumption that some regulation of interna-
tional relations through legal instruments is still both feasible and desirable.
Shared language can be more than shared rhetoric and can operate as a
norm-creating tool.
My inquiry follows in two parts: First, I question whether MLTs do in
fact create a shared language, in other words, whether they create common
and equal commitments. Second, I question the special normative and sym-
bolic pull ascribed to MLTs. In both parts, I consider the function of BLTs
as an alternative.
A. Uniformity and Equality
1. Uniformity
At first glance it seems obvious that if international law is to constitute
the shared language of all nations and states, it must be multilateral. Inter-
national must be not only multilateral but also uniform, imposing equal
limitations and obligations.42 Such equal obligations intuitively seem best
realized through MLTs: while a system of tens of thousands of BLTs creates
a cacophony of rules and arrangements, a regimented system of MLTs gener-
ates more uniform and more easily identifiable rules.43 MLTs also reduce the
possibility of states being subject to competing obligations and picking and
choosing their international commitments.44 MLTs can thus bind all states
together in similar and reciprocal undertakings and tighten the knot of
interdependence.
Moreover, even if not universal at first, MLTs have the capacity, at least in
theory, to generate “instant custom,”45 thus making their provisions bind-
ing upon all members of the international community over a relatively short
period of time. Universalists, therefore, seek a unified system of MLTs to
replace many of the existing, more limited, agreements; or, at the very least,
they seek to ensure that limited agreements are concluded in the shadow of
MLTs.46
But the normative aspiration for a unified, equal, and binding universal
law keeps stumbling against the reality of a system of equally sovereign
42. St´ ephane Beaulac, An Inquiry into the International Rule of Law 14–18 (EUI Max Weber Pro-
gramme Series Working Paper No. 2007/14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1074562.
43. JOS´ E E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 382 (2005) [hereinafter AL-
VAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS].
44. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 2 (protesting against the pick-and-choose policy); see also Corell, supra R
note 35, at 262–63. R
45. On the possibility of instant custom, see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 28). For a critique of this proposition, see G.J.H. V AN H OOF, RETHINKING THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1983).
46. See, e.g., Espen Barth Eide, State Sec’y, Keynote Statement at the Vienna Convention (Jan. 13,
2006), available at http://odin.dep.no/fd/english/news/speeches/010051-090029/dok-bn.html (“In order
to facilitate effective international cooperation, the goal should be to create a common legal foundation
and greater harmonisation of states [sic] efforts in developing legal instruments.”).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-MAY-08 13:29
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states, materially different from one another, and upon whose joint consent
the law depends for its enactment and observation. Thus, as things stand,
neither the making nor subsequent application of international law necessa-
rily meets the jurisprudential requirements of a domestic-like “rule of
law.”47 It is precisely in this context that the transposition of the domestic
ideal onto the international sphere falters.48
Some MLTs (such as human rights or trade instruments) do in fact enjoy
widespread ratification, thus becoming truly universal. But others fail to
attract a substantial number of parties. Examples of the latter category
abound: the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (13 parties), the 1991 Convention on En-
vironmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (41 parties),
the 1996 Agreement on the Establishment of the International Vaccine In-
stitute (13 parties), and the 1971 Agreement establishing the International
Pepper Community (6 parties) are just some examples.49 In fact, of the 522
MLTs deposited with the U.N. Secretary General, less than half have been
ratified by over a third of U.N. members, and only a third have been ratified
by more than half of U.N. members.50 A low number of ratifications also
prevents these MLTs from burgeoning into instant custom, as hoped for by
treaty designers.
Furthermore, even if the fewer treaties covering a given subject area mean
more uniform application, MLTs are not necessarily at an advantage. The
thousands of existing MLTs can themselves create competing regimes
within the same sphere. One should consider, for example, the rules pertain-
ing to anti-personnel landmines. Landmines have been the subject of Proto-
col II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons51 as well as the
1997 Ottawa Convention.52 Under the former treaty, the use of landmines is
47. I allude here to the principles set out by H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
48. See Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
305, 314–15 (2006) (“[I]t is not clear just how the commitment to the rule of law is to be cashed out in
the international arena.”). For a discussion of the normative concerns that must guide the quest for the
legitimacy of international law and the rule of international law, see generally Mattias Kumm, The
Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004).
49. Advanced Search Page of the United Nations Treaty Series, http://157.150.195.4/LibertyIMS::/
anon/cmd=XMlGetWebPage;CmdFile=XMlAdvSearch.cmd [hereinafter UNTS Advanced Search
Page].
50. Out of 258 treaties in force, 138 were ratified by 64 or fewer states, 166 were ratified by 96 or
fewer states, and 63 treaties have been ratified by 134 or more states.  The Constitution of the World
Health Organization, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
enjoy the widest ratification—they have been ratified by 192 states. See id.
51. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Amended Protocol II,
May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206. For an updated number of parties, see http://disarmament.un.org/Treaty
Status.nsf/CCWC%20Amended%20Protocol%20II?OpenView (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
52. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Person-
nel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (156 parties). See   http://disarma-
ment.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/APM%20Convention%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView (last
visited Apr. 7, 2008).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 14 20-MAY-08 13:29
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allowed; under the latter, the use is prohibited. The 87 countries bound by
Protocol II include most of the world’s major current or past landmine pro-
ducers—the United States, China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and Israel—all of
which have refused to join the Ottawa Convention. A similar situation arises
with regard to the treatment of cultural property in times of conflict. Four
different treaties are dedicated to this issue, in addition to various provisions
on safeguarding cultural property that appear in other instruments,53 each
proscribing certain actions but allowing others.54 Because treaties normally
do not supersede one another but rather exist side by side, the result is that
some actions can simultaneously be lawful for one state and unlawful for
another, depending on the treaties to which these states are parties. There is
thus an inherent tension between the universalization of the law and its
bilateral application in each particular case.55
Beyond the application of different treaties to different ratifying coun-
tries, reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”) added to rat-
ifications and accessions further vary the application of specific provisions.
Very few MLTs prohibit the addition of RUDs to ratification altogether.56
Consequently, even among parties to the same treaty, different rules may
apply depending on the RUDs added by a party and the acceptance of or
type of objection to these RUDs by others. In other words, RUDs effectively
turn MLTs into a series of BLTs. Ironically, the law concerning permissible
and impermissible reservations is itself ambiguous and the subject of much
debate among international law scholars.57
The lack of uniformity of rules and the failure to achieve universal ratifi-
cation of all MLTs bespeak a problem more fundamental than the self-inter-
ested reluctance of states to join the universalist enterprise or the individual
treaty conflicts between parties who are bound by conflicting provisions re-
53. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
54. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15,
1935, 167 L.N.T.S. 279; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769.
55. ROSENNE, supra note 22, at 31. R
56. For examples of MLTs that prohibit RUDs, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
art. 309, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 22, Feb. 28, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3; Rome
Statute, supra note 53, art. 120; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 30, June 21, R
2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.
57. On permissible and impermissible reservations in the context of human rights treaties, see gener-
ally Roberto Baratta, Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 413 (2000); Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 531 (2002). The subject of treaty reservations has recently been taken up by the International
Law Commission. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Reservations to Treaties, June 30, 2005, http://untreaty.un.
org/ilc/summaries/1_8.htm.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 15 20-MAY-08 13:29
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lating to a similar subject matter. This problem is the doubtful assumption
of value-coherence or of universal natural law; it is the question whether the
international community could actually agree on a truly universal constitu-
tion espousing common norms and values. It is here where legal rhetoric
hides deep moral and political disagreements.
Indeed, in the context of human rights norms, scholars have argued that
“human rights and Western liberal democracy are close to a tautology,”58
and that the “exclusivity and cultural specificity [of human rights norms]
necessarily deny the concept universality.”59 Recent attempts to devise an
international treaty banning female genital circumcision (also known as fe-
male genital mutilation, or “FGM”), which have met with fierce objection
on the part of some African and Middle Eastern countries, offer an example
of the deep normative divisions within the international community. Free-
dom of religion, cultural relativism, and protection of women’s health and
well-being all intertwine in the debate within and among African countries
on whether FGM should be prohibited by treaty.60 Although less common,
voices calling for the international banning of male circumcision encounter a
similar quagmire of arguments.
The skepticism toward the existence and scope of truly universal values is
not limited to the sphere of human rights. It is equally valid in contexts as
diverse as global health, environmental protection, economic development,
and labor standards, to name a few. As David Kennedy recently opined,
“[t]oday’s most pressing policy challenges do not lend themselves to one-
size-fits-all solutions and ethical nostrums . . . . [T]hose who explore diverse
ideas with different audiences will be more effective than a homogeneous,
tightly-coordinated movement.”61 The attempt to devise one-size-fits-all re-
gimes brushes over deep ideological rifts and often produces vague, mini-
mal, and essentially less meaningful uniform rules.
Moreover, even where the international community agrees on a univer-
sally held norm, it must still wrestle with the need to balance other compet-
ing norms. This ordering problem exhibits itself through what scholars have
58. Makau Wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra
note 3, at 149. R
59. Id. at 150.
60. Ass’n for African Women on Res. and Dev., A Statement on Genital Mutilation, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 418–19 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds.,
2000) (citing THIRD W ORLD—SECOND SEX: WOMEN’S STRUGGLES AND NATIONAL LIBERATION: THIRD
WORLD W OMEN SPEAK 217 (Miranda Davies ed.,1983)); see also Makau Mutua, Op-Ed., A Noble Cause
Wrapped in Arrogance, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2001, at D8 (arguing that the individual-centric Euro-
pean tradition does not fit with Asian, Islamic, or African traditions and so should not be considered
universal). In 2003, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) was adopted, including a prohibition on FGM. Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol),
Sept. 13, 2000, CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005), reprinted in Martin Semalulu
Nsibirwa, A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53 (2001).
61. David Kennedy, Op-Ed., Recasting UN’s Role, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2006, at A15.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 16 20-MAY-08 13:29
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termed the “fragmentation” of international legislation, meaning the exis-
tence of different and somewhat autonomous rationales underlying a variety
of regimes each proclaimed to be universal.62 These regimes often conflict in
their particular principles and institutions, their procedures and preferences,
and their primary goals: trade liberalization versus environmental protec-
tion, development versus environmental protection, trade liberalization ver-
sus development, trade liberalization versus human rights, and liberal
human rights versus communal human rights. Since the patchwork legisla-
tive process of treaty-making is incoherent and inconsistent, the norms en-
shrined by one treaty can conflict with those underlying another MLT. For
example, proponents of international regulation of pornographic and ob-
scene materials on the internet face the advocates of unregulated cyber flow
of information. The efforts to devise a Multilateral Investment Agreement
(“MIA”) for the protection and promotion of foreign direct investment
through the September 2003 Cancun round of WTO negotiations have been
foiled due to civil society’s concerns about its effect on the environment,
labor rights, and development.63 Developing countries that stress the rights
to healthcare and education, rights recognized by the 1966 International
Covenant on Education, Social, and Cultural Rights,64 find themselves at
odds with the developed world’s insistence that they protect intellectual
property under the 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights65 (“TRIPS”) agreement.
It is in this context that BLTs enjoy advantages. BLTs obviously cannot
provide a general constitution for the international society, assuming for the
moment that such a constitution is at least partly desirable or attainable. In
a world in which diversity is more natural than uniformity, however, BLTs
can produce arrangements that are more coherent in that they tailor their
arrangements to the specific needs and circumstances of the particular dy-
adic relationships they purport to regulate. BLTs are better structured to
meet the problems associated with fragmentation, competing values, and
cultural diversity. Bilateral investment treaties find the balancing point
among concerns for foreign investment, the environment, labor standards,
and cultural sensitivities in a particular dyadic relationship while allowing
for an altogether different balance in another dyadic relationship.
62. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Di-
versification and Expansion of International Law, June 30, 2005, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.
htm#_ftnref1.
63. A similar attempt to devise a multilateral agreement on investment within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) framework has failed for similar reasons. See infra
text accompanying note 151; see also James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization R
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 197–200 (2005).
64. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976).
65. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 17 20-MAY-08 13:29
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This lack of uniformity allows BLTs greater room for creativity, flexibil-
ity, and political expediency. A tailored arrangement also endows its authors
and their subjects with a sense of ownership over its provisions, thereby
increasing their propensity to comply. The uniformity of MLTs is thus
traded for the individual fit of BLTs. When the attempt to devise an MIA
through the WTO failed, countries turned instead to negotiating approxi-
mately 1800 BITs.66 The flexibility offered by those BITs, as one commen-
tator noted, allows “the United States [to] ensure that foreigners don’t
control its defense industry; France [to] ensure that its culture remains
uniquely French . . . and [lets] smaller countries have leverage when negoti-
ating against bigger richer nations.”67 Indeed, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development recently emphasized “the need for a certain
degree of flexibility to allow countries to pursue their development objec-
tives in the light of their specific needs and circumstances . . . .”68
In summary, although in theory MLTs promote uniformity in interna-
tional law, in reality they achieve only limited success. The ability of states
to pick and choose their obligations, even when ideals are multilaterally
established, hinders the creation of a uniform body of international law.
Uniformity comes at the expense of other values, such as flexibility and
adaptation to the special circumstances of a particular setting, which are
better promoted through BLTs.
2. Equality
Uniformity of obligations seems to promote equality among states be-
cause all states become subject to similar limitations, with no one state ex-
isting “above the law.”  Most MLTs enunciate a set of uniform rights and
obligations binding on all treaty parties, even though some anomalies of
power exploitation do exist, such as the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council and the Security Council’s right to sanction nuclear
countries for violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (“NPT”).69
Even if the uniform application of the rights and obligations contained in
MLTs could be achieved, however, applying notionally equal provisions to
different countries would not necessarily yield equal outcomes. In practical
application, the uniform treaty terms have very different effects on dissimi-
66. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.
aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). But see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and
Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 26, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (Oct. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3968&lang=1 (claiming that
the cumulative number of concluded BITs is closer to 2500).
67. Susan Ariel Aaronson, International Investment Carousel, 18 INT’L ECON. 56, 57 (2004).
68. UNCTAD, Systemic Issues in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/2 (Mar. 21, 2006).
69. See U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 18 20-MAY-08 13:29
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larly situated countries.70 Benedict Kingsbury argues that, in fact, much of
the world’s inequality is due to the notion of sovereign equality, which sanc-
tifies the idea of formal equality over substantive equality.71 Although there
are some MLTs that pay special attention to the difficulties of weaker states
by imposing different obligations on differently situated states—a practice
known as “common but differentiated responsibility” (“CDR”)72—it is a
rare phenomenon mostly limited to the environmental sphere and even then
an anomaly.
Of course, unequal uniformity is not limited to the MLT domain. BLTs
are mostly drafted in symmetrical reciprocal terms, which are often discrim-
inatory in application. In February 2004, for example, as part of its Prolifer-
ation Security Initiative to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the United States signed a bilateral treaty with Liberia (the
world’s second-largest shipping registry after Panama) that accorded each
other the right to board, search, detain, and seize the cargo of any vessel that
is reasonably suspected of trafficking in missiles or weapons of mass destruc-
tion (“WMDs”) on the high seas.73 Liberia, it turns out, does not have a
navy.74
Whether or not MLTs are more prone to discriminatory uniformity than
BLTs is an empirical question. Yet, on the whole, it would seem that any
multilateral arrangement that does not contain differentiated obligations, as
applied to materially differently situated states, would prove, on average,
more discriminatory than a bilateral one. Package deals, adjustments, and
side-payments that may compensate for discriminatory application are less
complex in a bilateral than a multilateral setting.
Beyond the equal application of laws as a derivative of the uniformity of
law, equality also may be promoted through the making of the law. MLTs
seem to promote this type of equality as all states are typically invited to
participate in a MLT-making conference, each having equal vote in drafting
and adopting the final text of the treaty.
It is a peculiar feature of treaty-making, however, that a state can partici-
pate in a treaty negotiation, drafting, and voting, without ever adopting the
treaty through ratification. Even if all countries participate in forming a
particular treaty, some of them, perhaps even the most relevant or affected,
70. For a critique of specialists’ efforts to establish a uniform international commercial law, see Paul
B. Stephen, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L
L. 743, 753–88 (1999).
71. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 599, 600–02 (1998).
72. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 276 (2004); Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New
Paradigm of Inter-state Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549 (1999).
73. Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement, U.S.-Liber., Feb. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm.
74. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526,
530 (2004) (citing Deal Lets U.S. Search Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A4) [hereinafter Policing the
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could opt out, thereby frustrating the regime and any claim it has to
equality.
Moreover, a universalist claim has been that IOs have enabled weaker
states to have a greater impact on the initiation of multilateral conferences
and the forming of MLTs.75 Power differences that easily permit stronger
parties to exploit weaker ones in bilateral settings are mitigated in the mul-
tilateral context by coalitions of weaker states.76 The multilateral setting
also compels every party to contract with every other party. This limits the
ability of stronger powers to design discriminatory regimes that may favor
some at the expense of others. The conjoining of efforts and resources also
allows weaker states to participate more cost-effectively in multilateral ne-
gotiations, whereas in the bilateral setting they would have had to indepen-
dently shoulder the burden of negotiating. Equal participation by all states
also increases the transparency of the MLT-making process. Consequently,
arrangements that are devised within a multilateral framework, as in the
areas of international trade77 or the environment,78 are perceived as more
equal and fair.79
But even with increased participation, it is unclear that a multilateral
setting would necessarily better serve the interests of weaker states. To be
sure, a small island state might indeed be better off negotiating means to
combat global warming through a coalition in a multilateral setting than
bilaterally with the United States. A group of more than twenty poor coun-
tries successfully blocked the MIA when they united in a coalition against
richer governments in Cancun.80 Ironically, this might have been a Pyrrhic
victory for the poorer countries, which were then left to negotiate, separately
and individually, a series of BITs with the richer countries. The Cancun
75. ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 283. R
76. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 6–7 (“[A] multilateral negotiating forum provides oppor- R
tunities for weaker states to form coalitions and organize blocking positions.”); Laurence R. Helfer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 18–23 (2004) (discussing bargaining coalitions in the negotiations over  the TRIPs
agreement).
77. World Trade Organization, GATS Training Module, Basic Purpose and Concepts: Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment, available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/
c1s6p1_e.htm (stating that the most favored nation principle “allows everybody to benefit . . . from
concessions that may have been agreed between large trading partners with much negotiating leverage.”)
(last visited Apr. 7, 2008); see also Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law,
51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 758 (2003) (arguing that “the Most-Favoured Nation principle (‘MFN’) of the
GATT/WTO regime has effectively made international trade a multiplayer game for its members.”).
78. For example, the Alliance of Small Island States, a coalition of forty-three small island and low-
lying coastal countries (thirty-seven of which are U.N. members), coordinates negotiation positions
among its members within the U.N. system, particularly in the areas of development and the environ-
ment. See Alliance of Small Island States,  http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008); see also
International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable
Development of Small Island Developing States, Port Louis, Mauritius, Jan. 10–14, 2004, Report, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.207/11.
79. Ikenberry, supra note 12, at 534; see also ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 283. R
80. See generally Amrita Narlikar & Diana Tussie, THE G20 AT THE CANCUN MINISTERIAL: DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES AND THEIR EVOLVING COALITIONS IN THE WTO, 27 WORLD ECON. 947 (2004).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 20 20-MAY-08 13:29
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experience is one that demonstrates how the multilateral negotiation set-
ting, even if theoretically beneficial to weaker states, proves very difficult for
weaker states to manage in practice.
Moreover, there could be instances in which the bilateral setting would
actually prove more beneficial to weaker states even if a multilateral arrange-
ment were possible. First, what constitutes bargaining power is context-
dependent. Intensity of preferences, viable alternatives to a negotiated agree-
ment, support (or opposition) from domestic constituencies, and even being
weak are all sources of power in negotiation. Negotiation theory abounds
with literature on how weak parties can reach favorable outcomes when ne-
gotiating with stronger parties, with coalition-forming being one of many
strategies.81 Many other strategies do not require a multilateral setting and
can operate even more effectively in a bilateral setting. Such strategies in-
clude the targeted swaying of domestic constituencies in the other country,82
broadening a country’s own alternatives to a negotiated agreement, con-
straining or worsening the other country’s alternatives,83 hand-tying, and
the posing of credible threats or promises.84 Although these strategies are
more effective in some settings than others, they suggest that the weak are
not always at their strongest in a coalition.
Second, it is possible that a powerful country might allow itself to be
more generous toward one weaker state, with which it enters into a bilateral
agreement, than toward fifty weaker states, which are potential parties to an
MLT. Bilateral free-trade agreements allow the United States to open its
markets more willingly in order to trade with a particular, often weaker,
partner (e.g., Morocco, Malaysia, Panama) than it would in the framework of
the WTO, where obligations are assumed toward all. In fact, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) had foreseen the possibility of
parties willing to commit to freer trade in a bilateral or regional context
and, accordingly, determined that its provisions would not apply to such
arrangements.85 There are also instances in which powerful countries prom-
ise weaker states technical and other forms of assistance in exchange for in-
creased cooperation over a matter of mutual interest, such as immigration.
The stronger party, A, has a specific interest in the cooperation of a weaker
country, B, but much less so in the cooperation of countries C, D, and E. A
BLT between A and B would therefore promise B much higher payoffs than
81. See generally POWER AND N EGOTIATION (I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 2000);
Jeswald W. Salacuse, How Should the Lamb Negotiate with the Lion? Power in International Negotiations, in
NEGOTIATION ECLECTICS, 87, 87–99 (Deborah Kolb ed., 1999).
82. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG.
427, 454–56 (1988).
83. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, 1 NEGOTIA-
TION J. 163, 171–72 (1985).
84. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22–28, 35–46 (2d ed. 1980).
85. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 24, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
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a comparable MLT.86 Externalities and distributional consequences may tip
the scales in favor of an MLT, enabling C, D, and E to benefit from the
regime as well, but A would likely impose less favorable terms on all partici-
pants, harming B. Although most MLTs do not exclude the option of a
more favorable BLT between A and B complementing the general MLT
agreement, principles like the MFN rule render additional BLTs difficult in
certain contexts.
Third, we must assume that stronger parties will be able to provide more
side payments of various sorts and thus push for their preferred deals even in
a multilateral setting. Although this ability might be somewhat curbed by
strong coalitions of weaker states, stronger powers will remain stronger in
any setting. Strong states also are able to multiply their power by forming
coalitions of their own. As Nico Krisch writes, “international law is both an
instrument of power and an obstacle to its exercise.”87 Moreover, in forming
coalitions, weaker states need to compromise among themselves on their
stated positions. In the context of international economic law, for instance,
Edward Kwakwa argues that most developing states are still “rule-takers,”
receiving rules set by the more powerful states.88 In at least some circum-
stances, therefore, strong countries may become even stronger in multilat-
eral settings.
Finally, faced with strong coalitions that reject compromise, more power-
ful states are apt to opt out of the regime altogether, as the United States has
done with the Kyoto Protocol,89 the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, and the Ottawa Convention. Opting out by powerful states
might render the regime less meaningful, as with the Kyoto Protocol, and
would inhibit the treaty’s provisions from becoming binding customary in-
ternational law.
B. Normative and Symbolic Power
MLTs, as a general rule, enjoy a symbolic and normative power far greater
than that of a random accumulation of more limited agreements. The pomp
and splendor that accompanies the MLT-making process—the thousands of
delegates, the expensive and prolonged conferences, the lengthy speeches
and tons of documents—often give the final product a celebratory aura that
86. It is also possible that on one occasion, B is made better off through a BLT, while on another
occasion C is made better off. In the aggregate, it is impossible to make a claim that any weaker country
is necessarily better off in a bilateral setting. But it is similarly impossible to assume it is better off in a
multilateral one.
87. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the Interna-
tional Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 371 (2005).
88. Edward Kwakwa, Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the State?, in THE ROLE OF
LAW, supra note 3, at 227, 232–40. R
89. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 16,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 1997 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
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most limited treaties lack. That a visible and embodied “international com-
munity” should come together to affirm its collective revulsion against ge-
nocide and torture, commitment to the rights of women, concern about the
fate of endangered species, or abhorrence of certain methods of warfare cre-
ates a powerful international narrative of what is good, right, and legitimate.
It is in part this normative and symbolic power that has drawn the attention
of legal scholars to MLTs.
The multilateral enterprise possesses, at least in theory, a discursive force,
whereby the norms incorporated into the multilateral regime reverberate
into and across national constituencies, become ingrained in public con-
sciousnesses, and are imprinted upon states’ behavior. For some international
relations scholars, especially those ascribing to the constructivist school of
thought,90 the symbolic and discursive power of these norms is also that by
which they become perceived and acted upon as legally binding. Looking at
human rights treaties, for instance, the power of MLTs lies to a large degree
in their widespread ratification. This ratification begins what may be called
an international conversation that absorbs human rights norms into its vari-
ous exchanges, validating and solidifying them as part of states’ binding
commitments.
Especially in the case of MLTs, which stipulate obligations erga omnes, a
convention may be adopted as much for its symbolic value as for its contrac-
tual one. As pointed out by the International Court of Justice in its 1951
Advisory Opinion on the Question of Reservations to the Genocide Conven-
tion, the contracting parties
do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a
common interest, namely the accomplishment of those high purposes
which are the raison d’ˆ etre of the convention. Consequently, in a conven-
tion of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvan-
tages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance
between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Conven-
tion provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the founda-
tion and measure of all its provisions.91
Judge Alvarez (dissenting) added that conventions of this type “have a uni-
versal character; they are, in a sense, the Constitution of the international
society, the new constitutional law. They are not established for the benefit of
private interests but for that of the general interest.”92
90. See generally ALEXANDER W ENDT, SOCIAL T HEORY OF INTERNATIONAL P OLITICS (1999); Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L O RG. 887
(1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Con-
structivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 185 (1998).
91. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28, 1951).
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Charting the boundaries of a normative “international society,”93 MLTs
also seem to distinguish the honorable members of the international society
from the less honorable, the law-abiding citizens from rogue neighbors. The
abundance of scholarship dedicated to “American exceptionalism” strives to
explain why the United States stands alone with Somalia in failing to ratify
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; why it meets Somalia once again
in the much-maligned club of states who have not ratified the Ottawa Con-
vention; and why the United States is yet again among those who have not
joined the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Underlying this effort is
the belief, at least of some, that non-ratification is the exceptional behavior
that must be explained and accounted for or else rejected as unjustified,
unilateral conduct.94
It is true that some MLTs strive to establish a normative constitution for
a transnational society, and when these MLTs attract widespread ratification
and attention they are successful in creating a shared normative language.
Relatively few MLT conferences, however, are actually the subject of wide-
spread attention or address such value-rich subjects as human rights, devel-
opment, and global warming. In fact, most MLTs pertain to more technical
issues, seeking to set uniform codes of conduct, standards, and reciprocal
arrangements. Examples include the 1995 U.N. Convention on Independent
Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit (currently with 8 parties); the
1954 Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road
Vehicles (78 parties) and its 1956 counterpart on Commercial Road Vehicles
(40 parties); the 1962 Agreement on Special Equipment for the Transport of
Perishable Foodstuffs (4 parties); and the 1974 Convention on a Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences (80 parties).
Furthermore, even treaties motivated by moral convictions and whose ne-
gotiation captures world attention may nevertheless meet with limited suc-
cess in attracting widespread ratification. For example, the 1990
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families has 37 parties;95 only 34 countries
93. Commenting on this socializing and constitutive power, Philip Allott writes: “At the beginning
of the twenty-first century, at long last, two centuries late, there is reason to think that we are witnessing
the first stages of a great metamorphosis of the international system, a change in the metaphysical
groundwork of international law, a beginning of the end of the Vattelian worldview. We are witnessing
the emergence of a universal legal system.” ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 9, at 59. See R
generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (writing about the socializing and acculturating force of interna-
tional human rights treaties).
94. See generally the various contributions to AMERICAN E XCEPTIONALISM AND H UMAN R IGHTS
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in
THE C OST OF A CTING A LONE: MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN P OLICY 345 (Shepard Forman &
Patrick Stewart eds., 2001); Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (2001).
95. Ratifications to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/13.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2008).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 24 20-MAY-08 13:29
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have joined the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;96 and
only 79 countries have joined the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others97—a number that does not include 9 out of the 14 countries listed
by the U.S. State Department as those who contribute most to the problem
of trafficking in persons.98 Even more strikingly, one in three U.N. members
have still not ratified the 1949 Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide99—one of the few treaties that should, theo-
retically, have been universally and unquestioningly accepted.100 Although
it may plausibly be argued that promoting norms and values of this kind
would be even more difficult through bilateral instruments, the modest
number of ratifications given to these MLTs indicates that the norm-setting
benefits of MLTs may be overstated. These numbers are certainly not as high
as universalists had hoped.
As earlier noted, RUDs added upon ratification or accession further en-
croach on the uniformity of rules, signaling only partial or conditioned ac-
ceptance of the allegedly universal norms that a multilateral treaty is
supposed to create. When RUDs are added, the normative and symbolic
pull of the agreement diminishes even more. Roughly one in four countries
ratifying the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) insisted on at least one RUD. Interestingly, a majority of these
belonged to the “Western European and Other” group of the United Na-
tions,101 precisely where the greatest normative convergence around the
terms of the covenant might have been expected. If conventions that purport
to express universal values, even jus cogens norms, fail to secure near-universal
ratification, such conventions run the risk of signaling the opposite. Lack of
ratification might prove that the value is in fact not universal and that the
norm cannot be truly conceived as jus cogens.
BLTs, in general, are more utilitarian, limited, interest-based exchanges
that are thin on values and symbolism. They rarely enjoy the same norma-
tive and symbolic pull enjoyed by MLTs, either in their making or in their
96. There were 34 states parties to the Convention as of Nov. 1, 2007.  United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3bbb24d54.
97. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitu-
tion of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951).
98. Press Release, White House, Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments’
Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/
prsrl/2005/53777.htm.
99. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
100. All numbers are drawn from the UNTS Advanced Search Page, supra note 49. R
101. See  U.N. Treaty Collection, Survey of Reservations, Objections and Withdrawals – ICCPR,
http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/Chapt_IV_4/CovenantCivPo.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008);
Martin Scheinin, Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Optional
Protocols – Reflections on State Practice, available at http://www.nuigalway.ie/sites/eu-china-humanrights/
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application. Except for a few high-profile exceptions, such as the 1986 Rea-
gan-Gorbachev Reykjavik Summit that resulted in the 1987 Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,102 the 1999 Vajpayee-Musharraf Lahore Dec-
laration,103 and the 1993 Rabin-Arafat Declaration of Principles,104 a bilat-
eral agreement is likely to remain under the radar of widespread
international interest. If publicity is the goal, MLTs serve the project of an
international constitution far better than BLTs.
This is not to ignore the numerous instances in which BLTs have touched
on core values of the international community, shaping and redefining them
and eventually accumulating into general custom. For example, trade agree-
ments that have incorporated human rights, environmental, and labor stan-
dards; bilateral disarmament accords; and agreements on immigration and
the trafficking in women and children. Statistically speaking, however, of
the 50,000 registered BLTs, most are unlikely to carry the same symbolic
weight or normative pull as multilateral agreements, except perhaps in their
aggregate.
A bilateral undertaking is more likely to carry a special normative weight
when the undertaking is particularly relevant to the practices of the two
states concerned. Thus, a bilateral agreement between warring parties on the
laws of war may serve to reinforce the agreement’s underlying norms more
than the ratification of a multilateral framework by the same two parties, or,
more poignantly, by parties who face no threat of war at all. I address the
relationship between the bilateral undertaking and the background multi-
lateral norms in the last section of this paper. It is also possible that incorpo-
rating norms into a series of BLTs that have more stringent monitoring and
compliance mechanisms may better serve to strengthen these norms over
time than an MLT, a possibility I discuss in the next section.
In short, universal MLTs can promote uniformity and formal equality,
but in reality their success is often uncertain and conditional. Although
BLTs impair uniformity, they fulfill other functions, such as tailoring ar-
rangements to particular relationships and balancing competing norms, and
are particularly important in balancing environment, labor rights, and de-
velopment considerations.
Although MLTs do promote the equal application of international obliga-
tions, their success in this context also is limited. Moreover, formally equal
application of similar provisions to differently situated countries does not
yield equal outcomes, and the inclusion of differentiated commitments in
MLTs is still the exception. Although BLTs are more susceptible to a pick-
and-choose strategy, they do allow for differentiated arrangements in differ-
ent relationships. Even though weak states enjoy coalition power in the mul-
102. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987.
103. Lahore Declaration, India-Pak., Feb. 21, 1999.
104. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-Palestine Liberation
Org., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 26 20-MAY-08 13:29
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tilateral setting, under certain circumstances individual states, even if weak,
benefit from bilateral contracts.
IV. COMPLIANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND EFFICIENCY
The lodestar guiding the movement toward universal legislation over the
past 150 years or so has been the increasingly dominant assumption that
global problems require global solutions: as wars have widened their scope,
so must law widen its scope; trade liberalization would mean little if it were
not undertaken by a sufficiently large number of states; dangers to the envi-
ronment know no boundaries and require the involvement of the entire in-
ternational community; terrorist finances will float freely across borders
unless stopped by coordinated regulation in every state; and human rights
could never be realized if they remained the pet cause of a handful of leading
states. The more interdependent our world becomes, the more international
cooperation is necessary to achieve collective goals and fend off global harms.
Interdependence also creates a legitimate interest for states in what other
states do or abstain from doing. Thus, concludes Brigitte Stern,
the only way to regulate the global economy and the global world is to
improve the efficiency of international law, both in respect of its con-
tent and its institutional framework: in other words, there is no solu-
tion apart from the creation of a truly world-wide international law system
of regulation.105
The effectiveness of the multilateral response is complemented by the effi-
ciency of the process through which equilibrium for cooperation is reached:
instead of accumulating thousands of bilateral negotiations in every possible
combination,106 efficient bargaining is achieved through one multilateral ne-
gotiation process. For example, instead of negotiating over 18,000 BLTs on
the reciprocal respect of the inviolability of foreign ambassadorial staffs and
premises in each particular country, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations107 established one common regime that applies to all diplomats.
Similarly, Richard Posner argues that treaties on the laws of war were meant
to create tort-like rights and obligations, and that negotiating them in an
MLT framework was therefore more efficient than doing so through a series
of BLTs.108 Accordingly, multilateralism, often with its regulatory compo-
105. Brigitte Stern, How to Regulate Globalization, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 247, 255 R
(Michael Byers ed., 2000) (italics in the original).
106. If every dyad of the 192 states who are members of the United Nations concluded only one
bilateral agreement, the total number of agreements would already reach 18,336 (this number is calcu-
lated using the formula n(n-1)/2).
107. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
108. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J. LEGAL
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nent, seems intuitively the most effective and efficient tool for facilitating
universal cooperation and policing international behavior.109
But despite the strong intuition that global problems require global solu-
tions, not all problems are global and not all global problems in fact require
global solutions. In order to assess the true function of both MLTs and, less
intuitively, BLTs in enhancing cooperation and policing international be-
havior, it would be necessary to distinguish among various types of goods
and regimes. I articulate benefits and shortcomings in terms of probable
compliance with obligations, the efficiency in bargaining over them, and the
effectiveness of their operation—criteria that regularly appear in the litera-
ture on treaty design. I start with a general overview of these considerations
and then proceed to distinguish among types of regimes, activities, and
goods. I believe that this distinction is necessary in order to get a more
refined view of the workings of MLTs and BLTs in different contexts.
A. Compliance, Efficiency, and Effectiveness—General Observations
I begin with the caveat that the questions of compliance, efficiency, and
effectiveness must ultimately rely on a combined empirical and theoretical
examination. Moreover, with regard to any particular treaty, these questions
can only be answered after the treaty has been concluded and entered into
force, and they must be assessed against other possible alternatives, either
existing or imaginary. With this caveat in mind, I turn to some general
observations on how the structure of the treaty—as MLT or BLT—affects
these questions.
Much has been written about the design of international regimes and
their effectiveness in promoting their stated goals through compliance.110 In
emphasizing the need to distinguish between compliance, in the sense of
following treaty obligations, and the ultimate effectiveness of any treaty in
attaining its goals, George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom have
introduced the term “depth of obligations” to denote the degree to which a
treaty obligation requires a change in the behavior of its parties.111 Only
109. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 123–24; T HOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNA- R
TIONAL RELATIONS–THE PATH NOT T AKEN: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE W ORLD PEACE
AND SECURITY 54 (2006); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph Nye, Jr., Two Cheers for Multilateralism, FOREIGN
POL’Y, Fall 1985, at 148–67.
110. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1979); Anne-
Marie Slaughter & Kal Raustiala, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002);
Harold Jacobson, Afterword: Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compli-
ance, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 569 (1998).  On the managerial school of compliance, see generally CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 15; on the transnational theory of compliance, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, R
Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2632 (1997); for a general bibliography and
ideological and methodological classification of international compliance literature, see generally Wil-
liam Bradford, International Legal Compliance–Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 495 (2005).
111. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good
News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 28 20-MAY-08 13:29
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deep obligations, so the argument goes, can produce effective outcomes.
Shallow provisions, although more easily complied with, are also less mean-
ingful in shaping behavior.112
Many scholars (although certainly not all) agree that MLTs tend to im-
pose open-ended, standard-setting obligations, rather than clear, specific
rules. This is the result of the need to accommodate the hodgepodge of
values, interests, and preferences of a large number of participants, the fear
of noncompliance by some participants, and the lack of immediate and di-
rect reciprocity among all.113 At the same time, however, there is a substitu-
tion effect between the depth of the obligations imposed by an international
agreement and the number of parties that will agree to accept these obliga-
tions.114 Universalists favor participation over depth of obligations, believ-
ing that parties will come to internalize the multilateral regime’s norms and
values through mere participation therein, even if the practical effects are
nominal at first. Very shallow obligations could subsequently be ratcheted
up through additional protocols or amendments propagated in an evolution-
ary manner.115 Universalists further argue that it is better to have shallower
obligations complied with than deeper obligations ignored or, worse, re-
nounced by parties defecting from the agreement.116
While this is a plausible account, it is by no means a certain one. Bruno
Simma, for instance, has argued that modern MLTs deplete the legal value
of treaties as a normative source of obligation because parties will concede to
compromises around the lowest common denominator.117 If Simma is cor-
rect, then an MLT conclusion is not a cost-free exercise, and there is no
reason to assume that obligations will develop from it in an evolutionary
manner.
112. The assumption here of course is that the obligations are not only deep but also “right” in terms
of means and ends. Also, as Goldstein and Martin argue, increasing depth is not always beneficial and
may even prove counterproductive: when obligations impose too much on the parties and leave little
wiggle room to respond to new developments or unforeseen challenges, parties might opt for a wholesale
defection from the regime. See Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 620–23 (2000).
113. Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 27, at 611. In comparing MLTs to multilateral soft-law R
instruments, Raustiala also observes that MLTs often contain shallower obligations because “[s]tates need
to compensate for the risk of their own noncompliance by weakening, monitoring, or watering down
commitments.” Soft law, on the other hand, being more of a “pledge” than a “contract,” as he defines
those terms, allows states to be bolder in the face of uncertainty. Id. at 582.
114. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: A Political Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 469, 514–19 (2005).
115. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15; Marc A. Levy et al., The Study of International R
Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L R EL. 267, 283–85 (1995). For a critique of this notion of treaty evolution
generally and in the context of environmental regimes more specifically, see generally George W. Downs,
Kyle W. Danish & Peter N. Barsoom, The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of
Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465 (2000).
116. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 27; Goldstein & Martin, supra note 112, at 620–23. R
117. Bruno Simma, Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 485, 485–94 (R.St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 29 20-MAY-08 13:29
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In contrast, since the bargaining process of BLTs requires compromises
between fewer parties, reciprocal concessions are easier to secure and moni-
tor, and deeper and more meaningful obligations may be assumed. At times,
such BLTs may propagate and diffuse to cover additional parties, thus evolv-
ing through already deeper obligations. Much of the law of war has devel-
oped in this manner. Other times, the bilateral exchange might deter
additional parties from assuming similar undertakings.
The efficiency of multilateral bargaining must also be weighed against
alternatives. Here we need to be careful not to confuse the efficiency of the
negotiation process with the efficiency of its outcome. Negotiating one MLT
may indeed be more efficient than negotiating thousands of BLTs (although
the failure of recent rounds of WTO negotiations may call this assumption
into question.)118 Even so, whether the resulting agreement is necessarily
more efficient than the sequencing and accumulation of separate accords is
uncertain. In fact, a multilateral negotiation is often essentially a series of
bilateral negotiations evolving toward coalitions and broader consensus.119
Moreover, in negotiating a given agreement, the chance of a Pareto opti-
mal outcome would seem higher when there are fewer bargaining parties,
provided other parties are not directly affected by the agreement.120 The
introduction of additional parties to treaty negotiations is hardly ever cost-
free. It potentially increases barriers to efficient agreements and exacerbates
problems of information asymmetry, strategic barriers, psychological barri-
ers, and institutional constraints.121 The multilateral negotiation process is
therefore more efficient than a limited process only if all negotiating partici-
pants are indeed relevant and necessary to the regime.122 If they are not,
bargains struck might be shallow—the result of having to disperse benefits
across the board—or excessive—due to the participation of parties who
would not ultimately share the burden of the costs of compliance. This point
was nicely illustrated by John Keynes, special advisor to the British delega-
tion, in his account of the Bretton Woods negotiations: “[T]wenty-one
countries have been invited [to Bretton Woods] which clearly have nothing
to contribute and will merely encumber the ground. . . . The most mon-
118. A recent Economist article predicts that “those keen on liberalising trade will focus on regional
and bilateral agreements. These are already proliferating . . . : just about every one of the WTO’s 149
members is a party to a regional trade agreement of some sort.” The Dying of the Light, ECONOMIST.COM,
Jul. 24, 2006, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SNTVVNQ.
119. On the sequencing of multilateral negotiations, see generally James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to
Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First, in WISE CHOICES: DECISION, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATION
324 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).
120. Later in the article, I address the issue of externalities and consequently the issue of efficient
outcomes from the perspective of the international community at large.
121. On the organizational, psychological, and strategic barriers to favorable negotiated outcomes, see
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross & Kenneth J. Arrow eds., 1995).
122. I return to the question of how “relevance” or “necessity” is determined later in this paper.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 30 20-MAY-08 13:29
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strous monkey-house assembled for years.”123 The real negotiation, he re-
ported, was in fact a U.S.-U.K. bilateral negotiation, with other delegations
(some not even speaking the language) simply facing a take-it-or-leave-it
option with regard to the outcome text of the bilateral negotiation.124
Another inefficient facet of multilateral negotiation arises when, as often
happens, a party participates in the treaty-making process and influences its
outcomes without ultimately joining the regime.125 Any individual state has
very little chance of single-handedly stopping an MLT negotiation process,
since it is almost always easier to say “yes” than “no” once the invitation to
the negotiation conference is out.126 But it is easy enough to resist ratifying
the treaty after it is concluded. During the Rome Statute negotiations, the
United States was successful in blocking ICC jurisdiction on the basis of
extradition by the capturing state, thereby watering down the treaty sub-
stance. Having thus substantially affected the ICC regime, the United States
ultimately declined to join it. The ability to manipulate the design of the
regime without subsequently accepting its prescriptions results in both inef-
ficient and ineffective outcomes, thereby diminishing the real ability of
MLTs to overcome collective action problems. This problem obviously does
not arise when the agreement is struck between particular parties, whereby
the negotiation assumes acceptance of the terms by all or by none.
It is impossible to generalize which treaty structure—the bilateral or the
multilateral—secures in principle more reliable compliance. Some scholars
support the universalist claim, emphasizing the importance of reputational
or prestige incentives for compliance in the multilateral context,127 espe-
cially given the increasingly common inclusion of monitoring, dispute reso-
lution, or enforcement mechanisms in MLT regimes.128 Others, however,
argue that monitoring and detection of violations, as well as the ability to
123. STEVEN E. SANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF T RADE IN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 30 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cited in RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY T RINITY: THE IMF, THE W ORLD
BANK AND THE WTO 40 (2003).
124. Id.
125. On the different legal implications of signing and ratifying treaties, see VCLT, supra note 20, R
arts. 9–18.
126. Jos´ e E. Alvarez, Symposium: Globalization & The Erosion of Sovereignty in Honor of Professor Lichten-
stein: The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 232 (2002); Kumm, supra note 48, at R
914.
127. See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, Multilateral Organizations After the U.S.-Iraq War, in THE IRAQ WAR AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES: THOUGHTS OF NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES AND EMINENT SCHOLARS 359, 370 (Irwin
Abrams & Wang Gungwu eds., 2003); Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319–20; An- R
drew T. Guzman, Book Review: The Promise of International Law, 92 Va. L. Rev. 533, 556–58 (2006)
[hereinafter Guzman, Book Review]; Ikenberry, supra note 12, at 535, 539. For a nuanced analysis of the R
effects of reputational concerns in different settings, see generally George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones,
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002). And for a skeptical view of
reputational concerns as inducing compliance, see generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputa-
tion (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128. Guzman contends, as a theoretical proposition, that dispute-resolution mechanisms are more
likely in MLTs than BLTs. See Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319–20; see also Barbara R
Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs
Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (2007) (finding that half of the treaties examined contained\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 31 20-MAY-08 13:29
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retaliate against violations, should operate more effectively in the bilateral
setting, provided there are no clear power disparities.129 Ultimately, as ear-
lier noted, it is an empirical question. But to date, little systematic compar-
ative work exists to support either position.130
A final parameter in this context is the stability of the regime. Multilat-
eral regimes enjoy a substantial degree of stability, a derivative of the pro-
hibitive costs of renegotiations among treaty members plus the stabilizing
feature of a bureaucracy where an IO is associated with the regime. Once the
treaty is concluded, any change to or amendment of its provisions requires
the consent of all of the original treaty parties in order to apply among them
(otherwise, the change or amendment would apply only among the con-
senting states).131 This means that any change to the original text necessi-
tates renegotiations among all parties, which is an extremely complicated
and costly task, operating as a disincentive for frequent changes. Conse-
quently, the durability of the original agreement is ensured.
This stability is at once a curse and a blessing. Almost every agreement
needs to manage the tension between ensuring its long-term stability and
allowing for adaptation to changing circumstances. But MLTs carry the im-
plied expectation that they are to continue indefinitely.132 This means that
any adaptation to reflect changing circumstances, new scientific data, or
technological advances becomes exceptionally difficult. As earlier noted, the
lack of flexibility and fear of noncompliance in the face of unanticipated
events might drive parties to MLTs to accept only shallower obligations. In
addition, the difficulty in renegotiating terms might deter countries from
dispute-resolution mechanisms and half did not, although not reporting whether such mechanisms were
more likely to be found in MLTs or BLTs).
129. See generally Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 132 (Keohane ed., 1986), first
published in 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 1–27 (1986) (showing skepticism about the power of reciprocity in general
and specifically doubting reciprocity in the context of multilateral exchanges).
130. While some empirical studies have addressed the inclusion of dispute-settlement and enforce-
ment mechanisms in treaties, these studies did not distinguish between MLTs and BLTs.  Most empirical
studies show that international agreements generally do not include any strong enforcement mechanisms,
nor do parties generally agree to subject themselves to mandatory dispute-resolution mechanisms. Nota-
ble exceptions in the MLT context are the WTO (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (in Part XV). Even where applicable, most dispute-settlement clauses have never been invoked.
While the number of international courts is on the rise, most international treaties establish neither
courts nor any other body with sanction-imposing powers. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at R
32–33; Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.  579, 582 (2005)
(arguing that sanctions generate a net loss to the parties where “one party faces a cost that is not recov-
ered by the other,” and thus, parties may choose not to utilize dispute-settlement mechanisms in order to
avoid this loss). See generally Raustiala, supra note 27. R
131. See VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 40–41. But see ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at R
336–37 for a description of exceptions to this principle in several IO constitutions.
132. For a discussion of flexibility as a determining factor in whether or not to conclude a treaty or a
“soft law” instrument, see Raustiala, supra note 27, at 591–93. See generally Hartmut Hillgenberg, A R
Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499 (1999).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 32 20-MAY-08 13:29
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participating in the regime in the first place or lead them to defect from it
later on.
One way in which treaty-makers attempt to resolve the stability-flexibil-
ity tension is through the framework-protocol treaty design, whereby initial
negotiations focus on creating broad, standard-setting framework conven-
tions and then details and further negotiations are channeled through new
protocols. This arrangement provides only a partial response and in some
ways only puts a different name to a familiar problem. The negotiation of
new and more specific regulations, such as protocols banning certain types of
weapons under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or negoti-
ation rounds under the GATT/WTO framework, is incredibly complex and
often unsuccessful.133 Changes to the original agreement in any case, unless
otherwise stipulated by the treaty itself, still require the consent of all of its
original parties in order to bind them.134
Bilateral frameworks, by contrast, are likely to allow for greater flexibility
and offer parties more opportunities for renegotiation and adaptation to
changing circumstances, thus potentially increasing the parties’ willingness
to initially accept deeper obligations. The danger, however, is that it is
much easier for stronger parties opportunistically to impose renegotiations
on weaker parties in such settings.
B. Compliance, Efficiency, and Effectiveness—A Typology of Regimes
To compare the workings of MLTs and BLTs in a more detailed and sys-
tematic manner, it is necessary to distinguish among several types of goods
and activities that serve as the subject of international regulation. I use com-
mon distinctions and criteria,135 including coordination versus cooperation
activities, universal versus club goods, and externalities-projecting versus
non-externalities-projecting regimes. Most of international regulation could
be categorized within this typology, thus making it possible to offer some
generic assessment of which structure of regulation would best fit in various
contexts.
1. Coordination Activities
Coordination regimes are established where states’ interests in a particular
issue converge around several possible equilibria and the only function of the
regime is to offer a focal point for coordination. Once the focal point is set,
133. See The Dying of the Light, supra note 118, at 1. R
134. See VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 40–41. R
135. Such distinctions have been suggested, in different framings, in the international relations litera-
ture. See generally EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); Kenneth
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT
RES. 3 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT’L ORG. 561
(1992); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and
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no party has an incentive to defect. Coordination efforts that seek to set a
focal point for a large number of states are most efficiently bargained for and
realized through MLTs. MLTs and supplementing IOs are useful in setting
and maintaining such focal points through iteration, dissemination of infor-
mation, monitoring, and assistance toward compliance.136 This is the case
both with regard to the original treaty and to any further elaboration on the
treaty’s original provisions. Examples of MLTs functioning in this way in-
clude the stipulation by the International Civil Aviation Organization of
international codes for aerial communication and the allocation of transmis-
sion frequencies by the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”).137
The more activities become international in character, the bigger the role
regimes have to play. Uniform measurements, standardized quality tests,
and mutual recognition of licenses and certificates are becoming the global
norm.
A limited coordination regime, conversely, would make sense in the fol-
lowing two cases: first, where the coordination effort addresses an activity or
subject matter relevant only to a small number of countries—a situation
that I address below; second, when the coordination effort affects a country’s
cultural, ethnic, or historical sensibilities, or is otherwise viewed as a coun-
try-specific determination. As an example of the latter kind of idiosyncratic
coordination, the setting of national holidays could not be regulated multi-
laterally. Even the seemingly innocuous synchronization of daylight-saving
time is done, if at all, on a federal or regional level but not on a universal
one.138 Here is how CBS News described the politicization of daylight-sav-
ing time in Israel and the Palestinian Authority:
Switching from daylight-saving time to Eastern Standard Time in
Israel has become a political act. Israelis switched early to promote
religious redemption. Palestinians decided to wait two weeks, citing
patriotism. As a result, the region has operated on two clocks—throw-
ing a lot of people off schedule: Businessmen were kept waiting, peace
negotiators double-checked their schedules, diplomats found their par-
ties pooped. It apparently even muddled terrorists, who killed them-
selves instead of their targets when their bombs detonated an hour
early.139
136. For a general discussion on how IOs promote MLT-making, see ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS,
supra note 43, at 338–400. R
137. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 10, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
138. See, e.g., Council of Australian Governments Communiqu´ e (July 14, 2006) (announcing that
“New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory will con-
sider synchronising the start and end dates for Daylight Saving Time”), available at http://www.coag.gov.
au/meetings/140706/index.htm; Council Directive 2000/84/EC, Summer-Time Arrangements, 2001
O.J. (L 31) 21–22.
139. My Clock is Better than Yours: Daylight Savings Time Conflict in Israel, CBS NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/09/17/world/main62701.shtml.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 34 20-MAY-08 13:29
356 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
At times, even when the activity is shared by many, a coordination agree-
ment between two (or among several) states may set a sufficiently strong
focal point around which all other countries will subsequently have to con-
verge. This is the case where these few states enjoy a special status or power
in the market. In the extreme case, one country alone can force all others to
follow. Lisa Martin, for instance, offers the example of how the United States
forced other states to move from an allocative to a market-based regime in
telecommunication, simply by committing itself to such a transition.140 In
such cases, a bilateral or more limited negotiation among the stronger play-
ers may be more efficient to begin with than a multilateral one.
2. Cooperation Activities
International regimes face a greater challenge in regulating mixed-motive
games, such as combating global warming, tracking terrorist financing,
stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS, or curbing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. In all of these instances, states have an interest in coopera-
tion, but the temptation to defect is also high.141 In such cases, which are
best framed as iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, the regime strives to set
equilibrium for cooperation and to stabilize it. Ideally, international agree-
ments, buttressed by international organizations, set out rules and proce-
dures that lengthen the shadow of the future, serve as a clearinghouse for
information, enhance transparency and communication, and offer issue link-
ages that generate higher payoffs for the parties.
When collaboration is required among a large number of states, multilat-
eral regimes help states to cooperate effectively by increasing incentives for
compliance, reducing fears of defection by others, and generally overcoming
collective action problems.142 Although most international agreements do
not establish a central, coercive enforcement mechanism, they do often offer
a looser form of decentralized enforcement through monitoring mechanisms,
rules of reciprocity, and the interest of parties to the agreement in preserv-
ing their reputation for compliance with international obligations.143
But while coordination games lend themselves more easily to multilateral
frameworks, collaboration efforts, which require all players to move away
from their dominant strategies, are not an easy fit for MLTs. Diffused reci-
140. Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT’L ORG. 765, 777 (1992).
141. Although realist international relations scholars have debated the institutionalist school for de-
cades, these debates do not challenge the institutionalist account per se, but only the degree to which
international regimes can in fact overcome power concerns. See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False
Promise of International Institutions, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5.
142. For a discussion on the ability of regimes to promote cooperation, see generally ROBERT O.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN W ORLD P OLITICAL ECONOMY 49–109
(1984).
143. Keohane, supra note 129, at 146–50; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, R
104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392–94 (1990); Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319–20; R
Guzman, Book Review, supra note 127, at 553–58. See generally Downs & Jones, supra note 127; Brewster, R
supra note 127. R\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 35 20-MAY-08 13:29
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procity among parties and greater difficulty in direct retaliation for defec-
tions complicate multilateral collaboration efforts. At the same time, they
may be necessary to overcome collective action problems and prevent free-
riding. BLTs, conversely, are easier to negotiate, monitor, and enforce
through direct retaliation. Bilateral exchanges lend themselves more easily,
through iterated interactions, to stable equilibria. They run the risk, how-
ever, of being more susceptible to power exploitations and to projecting
externalities onto third parties.
The next two subsections attempt to offer additional guidance on when a
multilateral collaborative regime should be sought and when it would be
preferable to design a more limited partnership. A more nuanced view of
adapting structures to settings should take into account the distinction be-
tween universal (common) goods and more limited (club) goods. When the
exchange of services is considered, material differences among states may
render an MLT unfeasible and undesirable. Another distinction should be
made between regimes that project externalities on non-members and those
that do not.
3. Universal Goods and Club Goods
Universal or common goods are those that belong or are directly relevant
to the entire international community.144 The universal regulation of com-
mon goods such as the environment, the high seas, and outer space makes
intuitive sense because it potentially affects every member of global society.
Regulation of the common goods ostensibly requires wide-to-global partici-
pation to be effective, and often encounters collective action problems that
MLTs might successfully overcome. Even if free-riders and hold-outs plague
global regimes and diminish their effectiveness, the rationale of the MLT
framework is a sound one in this context.145
This is not the case when states are attempting to regulate cooperation
over more limited goods, such as joint watercourses, boundaries, or oil
reserves, or when they seek reciprocal exchanges of commitments, as in ex-
tradition, investment, and cultural or educational exchanges. The terms of
such agreements are highly contingent upon differences between countries,
and are thus better negotiated as BLTs or LMLTs than as MLTs. The failure
of the 1997 International Watercourses Convention—a proposed MLT regu-
lating the allocation of water in international watercourses—is a good exam-
ple: the treaty itself contained only broad and vague guidelines on allocation
144. On the distinction between universal (also known as “common” or “public”) goods and “club”
goods, see generally RICHARD C ORNES & TODD S ANDLER, THE T HEORY OF E XTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996).
145. Of course, the line distinguishing between universal and more contained goods might not always
be clear: we might, for instance, believe that the protection of diplomats should be a universal value,
independent of a bilateral agreement between two particular states, or that principles for the allocation of
rights in shared resources should be universally determined.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 36 20-MAY-08 13:29
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and to date, more than ten years after its conclusion, has attracted only 15
out of the 35 ratifications necessary for it to enter into force.146 In contrast,
hundreds of BLTs and LMLTs have been concluded to allocate rights in joint
watercourses by riparians, both before and since the convention was
adopted.147 In commenting on the Convention, Eyal Benvenisti noted that
[s]tates taking part in multilateral negotiations over a framework
agreement refuse to make concessions or even indicate future readiness
to offer concessions, because the situation does not ensure reciprocal
concessions. . . . [S]tates stick to non-cooperative positions in anticipa-
tion of subsequent negotiations over the fate of the transboundary re-
sources they share.148
A more limited framework in the context of a club good also ensures the
non-inclusion of parties who are not directly relevant to the regime and
whose participation might skew the most effective equilibrium (for instance,
by using the negotiations of this regime to improve bargaining positions in
other contexts).
Counterintuitively, even in the case of universal goods, there may be in-
stances in which more limited forms of cooperation may still prove more
effective than MLTs. As earlier noted, the inclusion of additional negotiation
partners is not cost-free. A smaller but effective coalition may prove more
successful at attaining the goals of an international regime than universal
participation. In areas such as trade liberalization and environmental ar-
rangements, the effective coalition may be relatively large, although, even
then, success may largely depend on a smaller subgroup of states.
The participation of Vanuatu, for instance, in the Montreal Protocol or
the GATT/WTO may serve other purposes, but it is not necessary for achiev-
ing these regimes’ immediate goals. In other types of regimes, the effective
coalition may be as small as two, but those two may be very important
countries. The Cold War arms-reduction arrangements were concluded in
BLTs between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though other
powers (China, the United Kingdom, and France) also possessed nuclear
weapons. By comparison with those of the superpowers, the other powers’
arsenals were insignificant, and the strategic focus was therefore on a bilat-
eral negotiation. By a similar logic, a future international antitrust regime
would largely depend on an agreement between the United States and the
European Union that others would then have to follow to at least a substan-
tial degree.
146. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 36,
May 21, 1997, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess. (1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700.
147. See Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, Sharing Waters: Post-Rio International Water Manage-
ment, 27 NAT. RESOURCES F. 163, 166–69 (2003).
148. EYAL BENVENISTI,S HARING T RANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL
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Even the battle against global warming, largely viewed as a global enter-
prise, could effectively be taken on by a relatively small number of countries.
The current U.S. administration has called for a post-Kyoto anti-global
warming pact to be negotiated among at most the fifteen countries that are
responsible for eighty-five percent of greenhouse gas emissions in the
world.149 If this proposal was genuinely motivated by the will to design an
effective emissions-reduction regime, then such limited framework negotia-
tions may have actually proven more efficient and more effective than a uni-
versal alternative, at least in the short run. Subsequently, in December
2007, President Bush joined dignitaries and representatives from 180 coun-
tries, NGOs, IGOs, and the media (making up about 10,000 participants)
in agreeing on a roadmap for the negotiation of a successor to the Kyoto
Protocol by 2009.150 It remains to be seen whether such negotiation will
prove fruitful in that timeframe and who the key negotiating partners will
be.
Regional arrangements also demonstrate the minimum effective coalition
point: in order to regulate regional goods, only the agreement of the re-
gional states is required, since the introduction of additional, external actors
into the regime is only likely to complicate and burden the negotiations and
increase the operation costs of the regime once concluded. The attempt by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) to
devise the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) failed partly be-
cause the option was left for non-OECD countries to accede to the agree-
ment, prompting civil society concerns about the consequences of the MAI’s
arrangements for the developing world. Left only to OECD countries, an
agreement would more likely have been achieved.151
One should note that a bilateral arrangement pertaining to a club good
without the participation of other members of the club may be as harmful as
a universal regime that includes too many members not belonging to the
club. The 1959 bilateral treaty between Egypt and Sudan over the sharing of
the Nile River waters152 took no account of the eight other Nile riparians
who were obviously affected by the treaty. Moreover, earlier bilateral or tri-
lateral agreements now hinder a broader accord among all ten riparians in
the context of the Nile River Basin Initiative.153
149. Andrew C. Revkin, Conditional Support for U.S. Climate Change Plan; Bush Plan Seen as Step Toward
Consensus, INT’L HERALD T RIB., June 5, 2007, at 2.
150. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/
items/4049.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
151. For a detailed account of the failure of the MAI negotiations, see generally EDWARD M. GRA-
HAM,  FIGHTING THE W RONG E NEMY: ANTIGLOBAL A CTIVISTS AND M ULTINATIONAL E NTERPRISES
(2000).
152. Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt-Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 6519
U.N.T.S. 63.
153. See Mohammed Abdo, The Nile Question: The Accords on the Water of the Nile and Their Implications
on Cooperative Schemes in the Basin, PERCEPTIONS: J. OF INT’L AFF., June–Aug. 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June-August2004/mohammed.pdf;  cf. Ashok Swain, The\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 38 20-MAY-08 13:29
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There may be reasons to prefer a universal framework even if a minimum
effective coalition is all that is necessary to create an effective regime. This is
the case if the parties seek to promote redistributive goals or to ensure that
all countries benefit proportionally from the new regime. Left to their own
devices, stronger parties would show little interest in the effects of their
limited arrangements on weaker parties. Some countries would end up being
repeat winners, while others would keep drawing the shorter straw. The
participation of landlocked countries in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) conferences protected those countries’ in-
terests (for instance, access to maritime commerce), even though they had
little to contribute in terms of reciprocal exchanges of commitments, and
even though one could envision a treaty signed by maritime countries
only.154 But this latter logic has its obvious limits too, as countries can
neither practically nor normatively be required to consistently engage in
redistribution efforts. This point is closely related to the consideration of
externalities, which I address next.
Where differences among countries are materially relevant to the regime,
multilateralism is bound to fail. This is especially true in the context of
reciprocal exchanges of services. Extradition is a case in point: although
dealt with in some regional agreements, many countries would object to a
true MLT on extradition, not wanting to commit to extraditing their citi-
zens to all other countries without distinction.155 This would be partly due
to domestic constitutional constraints prohibiting the extradition of one
country’s citizens to another country, and it would be partly due to a reluc-
tance to extradite people to countries that have disreputable legal or puni-
tive systems. For similar reasons, countries’ cooperation in intelligence
sharing is carried out mostly through bilateral channels (which, unlike mul-
tilateral ones, allow for secrecy). Thus, BLTs allow countries to accommo-
date their specific interests and strike the right balance between national
and international considerations. Uniformity in such cases would be neither
desirable nor efficient.
Obviously, the classification of a good as universal or common is not al-
ways an objective or merely technical question. Rather, it may well be a
Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth, 22 SAIS REV. 293, 303–05 (2002) (suggesting
that it would be more practical and appropriate to begin with a sub-basin limited framework and only
then to broaden participation to include the other riparians).
154. There are forty-three landlocked countries in the world, not all of which have joined the UN-
CLOS. The United States opted not to join the regime, mainly due to concerns with regard to deep
seabed mining. For an excellent account and analysis of the UNCLOS negotiation, see generally JAMES
SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA (1984).
155. Where MLTs do provide arrangements for extradition in particular contexts, such provisions
usually defer to the national laws and treaties in force of the states parties. See, e.g., Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 99, art. 7. If not, such MLTs usually R
suggest extradition as an alternative to national criminal prosecutions by the capturing state. See, e.g.,
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts.
5–7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100.20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 39 20-MAY-08 13:29
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normatively and politically motivated determination. The sphere of human
rights demonstrates this point most dramatically. In some cases, human
rights abuses might tangibly affect other countries, for example, by spawn-
ing refugees or signaling aggressive tendencies by the country’s leadership.
But even when there are no tangible repercussions outside the borders of
that particular country, the present-day erga omnes commitment to human
rights turns the abuse into a matter of international concern. It thus ex-
presses a profound view of human rights as a universal common good, a
“natural global resource.”156
4. Externalities
Agreements among states often project externalities—positive or nega-
tive—onto non-member countries. A bilateral mutual-defense pact may
threaten a third country that is in conflict with one of the parties to the
pact. A bilateral agreement to cooperate in the development of new types of
weapons is another example. The U.S.-Soviet arms reduction agreements, on
the other hand, yielded positive externalities, as would bilateral agreements
on cooperation toward environmental protection. Some BLTs, such as mu-
tual extradition arrangements, impose almost no externalities on third
parties.
Externalities create stakeholders; affected parties have a legitimate inter-
est in a regime that projects externalities. MLTs are more useful, at least
normatively, in mitigating negative externalities and in redistributing the
benefits of positive externalities. They are less necessary when fewer exter-
nalities are involved. It may therefore be assumed that some spheres, such as
peace and war, the proliferation of weapons, or environmental cooperation
are best regulated internationally, while extradition, the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign courts’ decisions, or even investment and bilateral trade
best befit BLTs or LMLTs.157
When externalities do exist, a key question becomes whether the right to
participate in the regime should depend on a party’s ability to make a real
contribution to it or on the regime’s potential effects on that party. Take, for
example, Togo’s participation in a treaty dealing with outer-space experi-
ments. Togo itself has little to contribute to the treaty in a material sense in
the absence of the technology or the intention to conduct such experiments.
Nevertheless, it may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that countries
that do possess such technology and intentions do not engage in any mon-
156. On the universalism of human rights, see Louis Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of Human
Rights, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 13–14 (1989).
157. This observation may reinforce scholars’ view of the WTO as, in practice, an amalgamation of
BLTs rather than one MLT. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 22. But cf. Lloyd Gruber, Power Politics and the R
Institutionalization of International Relations 1–25 (Harris Sch. Working Paper Series 03.18, 2003) (argu-
ing that bilateral trade agreements do impose substantial externalities, forcing other countries who want
to compete in the same markets to adopt the least favorable terms provided for in agreements with their
competitors).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 40 20-MAY-08 13:29
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key-business in space. Of course, the same logic could make Togo a legiti-
mate stakeholder in almost every possible regime, including the U.S.-Soviet
arms reduction agreements or, closer to home, any peace agreement between
two African countries. Even assuming that every country affected by an in-
ternational agreement has some sort of normative claim to a voice in its
negotiation, granting a role to those with nothing to contribute may become
a burdensome, inefficient process and open the door for potential extortions
well beyond the immediate interest of the affected country.158 Once again, as
in the case of the classification of goods as universal or club, determining the
existence of externalities and defining stakeholders is not merely a technical
or objective question; rather, it involves ethical and political choices about
the nature of the international system.
To sum up, it would be impossible categorically to prefer MLTs or BLTs
along the lines of the compliance, effectiveness, or efficiency of the regime.
Despite the strong intuition that “global problems require global solu-
tions,” at times, more limited solutions are actually better suited to meet
certain global problems. In designing the right legal architecture, one
should consider the type of regime sought (coordination or collaboration),
the type of good regulated (universal or club), whether the activity imposes
externalities on others, and what would be the most efficient bargaining
process for both present and future purposes.
V. PROFESSIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
Some of the most often cited advantages of multilateral regimes have less
to do with the treaties that comprise them than with the institutional fea-
tures of the IOs that accompany them.159 Even though IOs are not unique to
the multilateral context (BLTs may also establish dedicated bodies to oversee
the implementation of agreements), as distinct legal entities they are much
more prevalent within it. A growing trend, corresponding to that of MLT-
making, has also been evident in the establishment of multilateral intergov-
ernmental organizations.160 This trend has been touted by universalists as
much as it has been feared by sovereigntists.
In this section I unpack these reported benefits into two groups: demo-
cratic legitimacy and professionalism. Although the two are closely related,
158. On the different weight of states participating in treaty-making on outer space, see Bin Cheng,
The Contribution of Air and Space Law to the Development of International Law, 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
181, 190 (1986).
159. On the role of international organizations in multilateral regimes in general, see ALVAREZ, IOS
AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43; KEOHANE, supra note 142; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jan Klab- R
bers ed., 2005).
160. Thus, the 2006 Yearbook of International Organizations lists 1759 international governmental
organizations in addition to almost 20,000 international nongovernmental organizations operating in
spheres as diverse as agriculture, health, arms control, labor, scientific cooperation, transportation, and
much more. 5 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GUIDE TO GLOBAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY
NETWORKS 2007/2008 3, 215–30 (Union of Int’l Ass’ns ed., 44th ed. 2007).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 41 20-MAY-08 13:29
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the first focuses on the stages of the initiation, negotiation, and conclusion
of the treaty, while the second focuses on the implementation and operation
of the regime. As IOs are more endemic to MLT regimes, the discussion in
this section centers on the pros and cons of multilateral IOs.
A. Democratic Legitimacy
Multilateral conferences have increased the diversity of actors involved in
the process of treaty-making to include not only governments but also non-
state actors such as NGOs, industry groups, international civil servants, bu-
reaucrats, lawyers, and other experts. These nontraditional participants do
not enjoy a vote on new MLTs but nevertheless influence negotiations
through their advocacy, reporting, and expertise.161 In all these respects,
modern multilateral treaty-making could be viewed as more participatory,
more transparent, more democratized, and hence more legitimate than tradi-
tional bilateral diplomacy.162
This benefit exceeds treaty-making. As part of a process of “deformaliza-
tion,” bureaucrats and experts form transnational networks and alliances,
transcending any particular state’s interest. This process has been perceived,
in scholarship and civil-society politics, as promoting, beyond international
law and regulation, a new form of  international governance,163 which is run
not only by states for states but also by transnational and supranational in-
stitutions, and which is concerned not only with the welfare of states but
with the well-being of individuals.164 International law thus reaches out be-
yond high-level diplomats and affects every human being around the globe.
This transnational idea gathered steam with the end of the Cold War, as
an invigorated United Nations began hosting World Conferences on the
environment, human rights, women, social affairs, human settlements, sus-
tainable development, and more. These conferences underscored the modern
shift from interstate regulation of interstate relations to a transnational regu-
lation of a global citizen’s welfare.165 Today, international organizations, na-
tional governments, and alliances of NGOs compete to take the lead in
promoting the conclusion of more MLTs. Canada and the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines won the lead on the Ottawa anti-landmine
161. ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 357–59. R
162. On the transparency of IOs’ decisionmaking processes through the involvement of NGOs, see
Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRON-
TIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 144–45 (David Held & Mathias Keonig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
163. SLAUGHTER, supra note 30, at 36–64. On the regulatory “layer” in the “geology of international R
law,” see J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT F ¨ UR AUSL¨ ANDISCHES ¨ OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V¨ OLKERRECHT [ZA ¨ ORV] 547 (2004) (F.R.G.).
164. Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 61,
74–75 (2005).  Koskenniemi further argues that the Cold War has also challenged the “constitutional”
order of international legislation through three forces that he identifies as “empire,” “fragmentation,”
and “deformalisation.” Id. at 78–88.
165. See id. at 73 (observing that, with regard to these U.N. conferences, “[t]his surely seemed like
world government by world conferences adopting universal standards”).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 42 20-MAY-08 13:29
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process; Trinidad and Tobago revived the discussions in the United Nations
over an international criminal court in 1989; the World Health Organiza-
tion, supported by a transnational alliance, initiated the Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control in 1999; and in 2003 Amnesty International,
Oxfam, and the International Action Network on Small Arms jointly
launched the global Control Arms campaign for promoting an international
Arms Trade Treaty. MLTs have become a new form of international political
startup.166
But whether greater involvement by a larger number of actors necessarily
denotes greater democratic legitimacy is questionable. This is another in-
stance in which analogies from the domestic lawmaking sphere are problem-
atic. Private and nongovernmental actors involved in international treaty-
making belong to a very specific subset of the international community.167
Men influence it more than women; the rich have a much more vocal pres-
ence than the poor; and some cultural tenets dominate it at the expense of
others.168 The marketplace of ideas is not equally open to all. One can imag-
ine that during the WTO tuna-dolphin dispute, far more NGOs were happy
to argue for the dolphins than for the tuna-dependent fishermen; the latter
were represented only by their governments, not “civil society” at large.
Distortions of this kind can have a real effect on negotiated outcomes. As
Koskenniemi notes,
[p]rivate actors, stakeholder groups and experts will receive a position
alongside public actors in a decision-making process geared toward ra-
pidity and effect. The counterpart does not come from public diplo-
macy but from amorphous political groups, anti-globalisation lobbies
and social movements with a strategy that [is] no longer geared toward
a public law governed liberal federation.169
Kenneth Anderson has similarly criticized developments in multilateral
treaty-making, arguing that international law has been hijacked by essen-
tially undemocratic modes of supranational lawmaking, through the influx
of NGOs and international civil society, and that therefore there may be
valid reasons for the United States and other countries to withhold their
consent from certain suspect regimes; or at least, the United States should
not be accused of being a unilateral imperialist, as it was struggling against
166. On competition among IOs in the making of treaties, see ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra
note 43, at 285–86. R
167. Mancur Olson’s observations with regard to better-organized domestic interest groups being able
to exert greater pressure on governments are valid in the international sphere as well. See MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22–36 (1965).
168. On feminist critiques of international lawmaking, see HILARY C HARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE
CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000). On racial critiques,
see Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L.
REV. 841 (2000).
169. Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 80. R\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 43 20-MAY-08 13:29
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the imperialism of the “international civil society.”170 While serving as
chair of the advisory board of the Open Society Institute’s Landmines Pro-
ject, which funds activities in support of the international NGO campaign
to ban landmines, Anderson was bold enough to observe,
I hope and, as an international NGO activist, strive hard to cause the
United States to join the Ottawa Convention. But no matter how many
non-governmental organizations across the globe adopt this position,
they do not “democracy” make. They—we—are pressure groups, po-
litical lobbying groups, and they do not confer democratic legitimacy,
least of all upon the profoundly undemocratic organs of the interna-
tional system.171
These observations add to frequently raised concerns about international
organizations, and particularly the “democratic deficit” caused by an exag-
gerated delegation of powers to such institutions without sufficient account-
ability: decisionmaking and rule-making powers, traditionally within the
sole domain of the executive or legislature of every state, are now regularly
exercised by IOs. This transfer of the locus of power is viewed by some as the
disempowerment of the state as a governing unit and the distancing of deci-
sionmaking and governance away from the people.172 Some scholars have
even argued that the MLT agenda actually exacerbates state sovereignty at the
expense of democratic participation by domestic interest groups in the inter-
national lawmaking process.173
Naturally, these critiques have not remained unanswered. Robert Keo-
hane, for instance, has argued that intergovernmental organizations are an
easy target to pick on because they are “weak and visible” and because they
lend themselves more easily to notions of reform than more powerful enti-
ties, such as multinational corporations or states.174 The comparison, others
argue, is not between MLTs as they exist today and ideal internationally
democratic structures, but between the former and an old-fashioned, state-
centric system, which leaves almost no room for voices outside it to be
heard.
170. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Govern-
mental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91, 97–99 (2000).
171. Id. at 120.
172. These types of arguments have been voiced with respect to globalization in general. See, e.g.,
ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 289 (2004); RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (1999). Regard-
ing the burgeoning study of global administrative law, see generally Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury,
Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2006).
173. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism,1   CHI. J. INT’L L. 381,
392–96 (2000) (arguing that we need a discriminating view of multilateralism in which we favor it when
it enhances democracy, as in the case of international trade, but truncate it when it enhances the power of
the states, and consequently, the power of stronger interest groups within the state).
174. Keohane, supra note 162, at 146. R\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 44 20-MAY-08 13:29
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BLTs do not generate critiques of “democratic deficit.” Initiation of BLTs
is usually the province of governments and bureaucracies, less of civil soci-
ety, although the ability of non-state actors to influence the course of bilat-
eral negotiations is well-recorded, both in theory and in practice.175 Unlike
the process for making MLTs, the BLT-making process attracts little atten-
tion—and consequently less involvement, for better or worse—by actors
outside the immediate countries and citizens concerned. Thus, while the
Doha Round negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement attracted
huge attention, the 2000 separately negotiated BLTs, which in accumula-
tion had similar (if not greater) impact, were generally overlooked by inter-
national coalitions. A similar dynamic has been apparent in bilateral free
trade agreements negotiated by the United States, which often include cru-
cial provisions in the areas of environmental protection or access to patented
pharmaceuticals. This makes it harder for domestic constituencies to rely on
transnational alliances and coalitions in influencing their own governments.
Once the agreement enters into force, its implementation is then handled
either by the existing bureaucratic apparatus or, less commonly, a dedicated
new body.
It may therefore be claimed that the initiation, negotiation, and imple-
mentation of BLTs are consequently closer to the people that are affected by
the treaty than the doings of a more remote international bureaucracy. In
that sense, a BLT’s regime is more accountable to the citizens it affects.
Naturally, where the government is not accountable to its own people, the
lack of ability of citizens to influence the terms of the agreement makes the
notion of being closer to the people an empty one. In addition, the flip side
is the roster of issues discussed in previous sections: the dangers inherent in
power-exploitation, the ignoring of negative externalities projected by the
agreement, and the potential inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the regime.
When domestic constituencies or weaker governments are facing a superior
counterparty and in need of external support, the fact that their bilateral
dealings attract less attention and interest is to their great disadvantage.
B. Professionalism
An alternative source of legitimacy for international regimes may be
found in the professionalized transnational bureaucracy that is responsible
for crafting, expanding, monitoring, and at times implementing multilat-
eral agreements. The coming together of experts and professionals, who are
perceived as objective as opposed to politically biased, endows the regime
with a professional legitimacy. This is part of the coming of age of interna-
tional law, which is no longer only a mirror of politics but objective, more
175. See Putnam, supra note 82, at 436. R\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 45 20-MAY-08 13:29
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like real law, requiring professionals to make and administer it.176 IOs and
their professionalized bureaucracies are performing these functions and driv-
ing the propagation of additional MLTs, investing the insights, knowledge,
and practice accumulated in the making and operation of the original MLT.
Accordingly, Jos´ e Alvarez argues, modern MLTs “can no longer be judged
the way we judged the 19th century compact—through a snapshot frozen at
a single moment in time. The success of these living treaties is now best
measured through a modern motion picture, which is able to record their
evolutionary development across time.”177 This international professional-
ism also reverberates onto developing countries, serving as an example and a
resource for their own bureaucracies.178
But the bureaucratization of the process, which ostensibly contributes to
the specialization and professionalization of the regime, also makes the bu-
reaucrats repeat winners at the expense of other interested parties.179 Though
generally celebrating the accomplishments of international organizations,
Alvarez notes that
IO bureaucracies, like bureaucracies elsewhere, may also prove ineffi-
cient or ineffective at encouraging agreement; they may develop their
own agendas at the expense of the state principals they ostensibly
serve. . . . [P]ath dependencies, such as an infatuation with decisions by
“consensus” however cosmetic, may lock negotiations onto the wrong
historical path or result in meaningless lowest common denominator
solutions. Modern international law is strewn with the wreckage of
package deals that fail to secure the rates of ratification expected within
a reasonable time . . . .180
Alvarez finds a surprising ally in John Bolton, who argues that bilateral
cooperation has proven much more efficient and effective at combating the
proliferation of WMDs by not “relying on cumbersome treaty-based bureau-
176. Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 66–67 (“International treaties in R
their totality will be the Law-book of international law.” (quoting and translating OTFRIED NIPPOLD,
DER V ¨ OLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAG, SEINE STELLUNG IM RECHTS-SYSTEM UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG F ¨ UR DAS
INTERNATIONALE RECHT 274 (Berne, Wyss 1894))).
177. Alvarez argues that these managerial regimes have deepened over time and that all offer “the
prospect of a virtually continuous legislative enterprise.” Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, supra note 126, R
at 221–22  (quoting Gunter Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge of International
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (W. Lang et al. eds., 1991)); see
also ALVAREZ, IOSA S  LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 316–31 (discussing “managerial” forms of treaty- R
making).
178. See generally GILI S. DRORI ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTITUTIONALIZA-
TION AND GLOBALIZATION (2003) (documenting the diffusion of science, scientific methods, and scien-
tific discourse as a global culture, empowering and guiding the behavior of states and supporting
development).
179. Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 75. R
180. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, supra note 126, at 222. For a further critique of the role of R
experts—predominantly, international lawyers—in treaty-making, see generally David Kennedy, The
Julius Stone Memorial Address 2004 at the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence, University of Sydney: Challeng-
ing Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance,  27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 46 20-MAY-08 13:29
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cracies.”181 In describing the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”)—a
system of bilaterally negotiated safeguards between the United States and
other countries to monitor and prevent the shipping of WMD materials
through major seaports—Bolton comments,
[i]n developing PSI, our main goal has been a simple one: to create the
basis for practical cooperation among states to help navigate this in-
creasingly challenging arena. We often say, “PSI is an activity, not an
organization.” This is not hard to understand, but is unusual. We
think it is a fundamental reason for PSI’s success to date. PSI is not
diverted by disputes about candidacies for Director General, agency
budgets, agendas for meetings, and the like. Instead, PSI is almost en-
tirely operational, relying primarily on the activities of intelligence,
military, and law enforcement agencies.182
Whether or not the interest in preventing WMD proliferation might
have been better served through a formal multilateral regime, comple-
mented by a dedicated organization for monitoring, consultation, and re-
porting, is questionable. What has been seen as an imposition of power by
the United States has caused resentment to the point of self-exclusion by
others. China, for instance, announced that it would not support PSI, citing
legal concerns.183 This is an example of an ideological aversion to multilater-
alism that is potentially counter-productive. But Bolton’s point highlights
another important aspect of the efficiency debate, demonstrating that effi-
ciency pertains not only to the negotiation process but also to the operation
of the regime concluded.
To sum up, much of the attraction of MLTs lies in their perception as
more inclusive democratic instruments through the professionalism associ-
ated with their making and application. These benefits may be overstated
and are not risk-free. BLTs may be more democratic in being closer to the
people and eliminating foreign interests from hijacking the negotiation of
the agreement. In any case, as a sociological observation, the enormous
growth of the global administrative community, which suggests and drafts
additional multilateral instruments and helps establish treaty bodies, is un-
doubtedly a major force behind the expansion of universalism.
181. John R. Bolton, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New
Century: The Bush Administration’s Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation,5   CHI. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (2005).
It is interesting to note that Bolton himself is a devout unilateralist, who nevertheless acknowledges here
the need for bilateral cooperation.
182. Id. at 400.
183. Edward Lanfranco, China Won’t Sign on to PSI, SPACE WAR, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.spacewar.
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VI. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INTERACTIONS
From the foregoing discussion it becomes apparent that any decisive pre-
sumption in favor of multilateralism or bilateralism would overreach, both
normatively and descriptively, and would stand the chance of being self-
defeating for either side of the universalist/unilateralist debate. The relative
merits of multilateral and bilateral regimes come into view only upon a
more nuanced examination of different kinds of international cooperation
across a variety of subject matters. The environment, trade and investment,
human rights, diplomatic immunities, the sea and the moon, resource shar-
ing, transport and telecommunication, health, and education are all, in the
context of treaties, different types of “goods” that necessitate different types
of international cooperation, lending themselves more naturally to different
types of regulatory regimes. Values such as promoting the rule of law, equal-
ity, effectiveness, and democratic legitimacy may all be advanced through
MLTs but may, at times, be better realized through more limited forms of
cooperation.
No less importantly, neither MLTs nor BLTs operate in a vacuum. All
treaties are buildings or structures in the overall architecture of international
law. Or, to use Joseph Weiler’s metaphor, bilateralism and multilateralism
are but two strata in the more complex geology of international law.184
Viewing each structure on its own closes off from view the myriad ways in
which they interact with one another: how they complement, enrich, and
strengthen one another, and also how they might inhibit or obstruct one
another. Understanding the full scale of interaction makes the choice be-
tween designing BLTs or MLTs at any particular moment even more conse-
quential. Although the previous sections have already alluded to some
possible interactions, the following section is dedicated to their systematic
exposition.
First, in their simplest and most elemental form, BLTs fully reproduce
multilaterally designed legal rules, merely repeating the latter to reinforce
them in the bilateral context. Such repetition is not redundant. Dyads of
countries may wish to conclude bilateral agreements for symbolic reasons,
emphasizing their intent to abide by an already multilaterally assumed com-
mitment toward one another in particular. India and Pakistan, for instance,
concluded a bilateral agreement on the treatment of their respective diplo-
matic and consular staff,185 even though both countries were already parties
to the corresponding multilateral Vienna conventions.186 The fact that the
184. Weiler, supra note 163, at 551. R
185. See Jawed Naqi, India Accuses Pakistan of Harassing Its Diplomats, DAWN, Nov. 10, 2001, available
at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top6.htm (discussing the Code of Conduct for the Treatment of
Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and Pakistan).
186. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 107; Vienna Convention on Consular R
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 48 20-MAY-08 13:29
370 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
agreement was signed amidst an enduring conflict between the two coun-
tries gave the bilateral agreement a special political and normative clout,
which the Vienna conventions did not have.
Another reason to reproduce a multilateral commitment in a bilateral in-
strument is the belief that the pledge would carry more weight in the bilat-
eral setting, where retaliation for violations is potentially more immediate
and precise. The pre-existence of the multilateral norm makes it easier to
repeat in the bilateral agreement. It is also possible that the multilateral
rule, with its existing body of accepted practical application and interpreta-
tion may then operate to stabilize and reinforce the bilateral agreement.
Thus, in the United States-Singapore (2003),187 United States-Chile
(2003),188 and United States-Morocco (2004)189 Free Trade Agreements
(“FTA”), labor obligations were included in the core text, ostensibly rein-
forcing neglected multilateral commitments already undertaken under the
framework of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”). Presumably,
the incorporation of these commitments into the bilateral instrument adds
to their force and increases the likelihood of compliance. It also brings the
labor obligations into the ambit of the mandatory dispute resolution mecha-
nism operating under the FTA, a mechanism which does not exist under the
ILO regime. Empirical analysis should be able to show whether labor prac-
tices have actually improved following the conclusion of such trade
agreements.
Second, BLTs may translate legal arrangements, which include only vague
standards in their multilateral setting, into concrete commitments in a par-
ticular case. The UNCLOS, for example, provides general guidance on the
delimitation of maritime boundaries, the division of continental shelves, and
the allocation of fishing rights in contiguous zones. But the application of
its provisions in any particular sea requires a BLT (or LMLT) that takes into
account the specific geographical conditions of the area. A similar need for
individual application often causes trade disputes within the GATT/WTO
frameworks to be resolved by bilateral agreement. In fact, in almost any
international dispute, parties invoke general international rules, treaty-based
or customary, in support of their opposite stances. The extent to which
MLTs or multilateral customary norms ultimately inform and govern the
negotiated resolution of international disputes is unclear and demands fur-
ther empirical study.
187. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 948, availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_
file708_4036.pdf.
188. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Dep’t State 04-35 availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file
535_3989.pdf.
189. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.
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Third, even when corresponding to existing multilateral norms and rules,
BLTs can do more than simply repeat or adapt general norms to bilateral
settings. Rather, given the more limited bargaining setting, they may pre-
scribe deeper obligations and even prove more effective in inducing compli-
ance. Some bilateral agreements on environmental cooperation entail deeper
and more detailed commitments than MLTs aimed at similar goals.190 Thus,
bilateral agreements between the United States and Australia and the
United States and India included arrangements on technology and informa-
tion-sharing, which the United States had earlier refused to introduce in the
multilateral environmental agreements.191
The practice of imposing deeper obligations through BLTs is even more
common in the security sphere. In that context, it is customary to include
deeper obligations even when the parties are not bound by any correspond-
ing multilateral commitment. Even before they joined any regional or mul-
tilateral non-proliferation regime, Brazil and Argentina concluded a
bilateral nuclear disarmament agreement, which included an inspection re-
gime far more transparent and intrusive than that required by the NPT.192
This regime is still active, despite both countries’ subsequent accession to
both the NPT and the Mercosur regional nonproliferation framework.193 Re-
cently, various bilateral treaties have granted state parties the power to in-
terdict the transport of WMDs on the high seas more explicitly than any
existing MLT.194
Even when jus cogens norms are at stake, as in the prohibitions on geno-
cide, racial discrimination, torture, or war crimes, BLTs may still prove a
useful tool against the backdrop of an existing MLT. It is feasible to imagine
more robust protection of human rights through bilateral instruments when,
for instance, the latter offer a package deal which conditions lucrative trade
on better human rights performance. The bilateral framework allows more
190. See, e.g., Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile, U.S.-Chile, June 17, 2003, Dep’t State
04-86, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/22185.htm (establishing work programs to promote
the joint collection and publication of information on both parties’ environmental legislation, policies,
practices, and enforcement activities); Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. 11,783 (setting specific objec-
tives for emissions limitations or reductions of air pollutants and adopting the necessary programs and
other measures to implement such specific objectives), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/prog-
sregs/usca/agreement.html.
191. See U.S.-Australia Climate Action Partnership, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/87665.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2008). For an example of the progress of this bilateral partnership and its activities,
see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/rmks/11788.htm.
192. See Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),
available at http://www.abacc.org/engl/abacc/abacc_estructure.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
193. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762,
634 U.N.T.S. 281 (“Treaty of Tlatelolco”).
194. See Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 74, at 529–30. Byers also notes that “[t]he Prolifera- R
tion Security Initiative is reflective of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward a more flexible approach to
collective action that eschews both ad hoc unilateralism and institutionalized multilateralism.” Id. at
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effective monitoring of practices, stronger dispute resolution procedures, and
more immediate incentives for compliance. The United States-China trade
agreements have tied, albeit indirectly, U.S. trade commitments to proven
improvements in Chinese human rights practices. Such bilateral instruments
may carry both normative and substantive power to promote values that
MLTs alone have failed to secure.
The 1996 Israel-Lebanon Understanding195 provides another example of a
bilateral agreement surpassing jus cogens norms. Mediated by the United
States and France in response to escalation in hostilities between Israel and
Lebanese armed groups, the Understanding sought to accord civilians on
both sides of the border absolute protection from all injury. This absolute
protection marked a departure from the generally accepted laws of war,
which acknowledge and legitimize the collateral effects of lawful warfare on
civilians, toward greater protection of civilians regardless of considerations
of military necessity. The regime was mildly successful in its mission.196
In all these cases, BLTs build on existing MLTs to promote more effec-
tively values that we perceive to be global—human rights, environment,
disarmament, etc. In most cases, the existence of a prior MLT, which signals
a broad recognition of the underlying norms and interests, makes it easier
and at times even possible to conclude a complementary BLT. The latter’s
limited bargaining setting, in turn, allows parties to be more daring and
more generous in their exchanges. The absolute immunity accorded by the
Israel-Lebanon Understanding to civilians amidst ongoing hostilities could
never have been negotiated universally, then or today. The parties’ willing-
ness to accept blame for actions that would have been recognized as lawful
actions taken in self-defense under general laws of war was a unique feature
of this agreement. The more limited framework, which was tailored to the
specific characteristics of the conflict, undoubtedly allowed the parties to be
bolder in their undertakings and experiment with deeper obligations than
those in existence.
When we think of the practice of deepening norms via BLTs, it should
not be assumed, however, that starting out with a MLT and then ratcheting
up obligations through a series of BLTs is always a risk-proof strategy. There
may be cases in which multilateral contracting might make it easier for
states to resist deeper bilateral obligations by pointing to their already-ex-
isting multilateral commitments. Nor is it the case that the bilateral treaty
is always intended for augmenting the multilateral undertaking. In fact,
oftentimes a bilateral agreement is intended for exactly the opposite pur-
pose. There is evidence that free trade agreements negotiated by the United
States will tend to increase protection for intellectual property, beyond the
195. U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Isr., Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding (Apr. 26, 1996), availa-
ble at http://israel.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/documents/ceasefire_understanding.html.
196. On the experience of the Israel-Lebanon Understanding, see GABRIELLA B LUM, ISLANDS OF
AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES 190–241 (2007).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 51 20-MAY-08 13:29
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stipulation of TRIPS, at the expense of access to affordable medicines in the
other country.197 Clear power disparities within these dyadic relationships
allowed the stronger party to evade more equitable terms and bargain to its
own advantage.
Fourth, bilateral treaties are often used as carrots to induce parties to join
or adhere to multilateral regimes. The 1994 trilateral United States-Russia-
Ukraine agreement offered the Ukraine greater security assurances and eco-
nomic incentives in exchange for the transfer of its nuclear weapons to Rus-
sia,198 thus ensuring that Russia is the sole successor to the Soviet Union as a
nuclear power under the NPT framework. But just as bilateral instruments
are sometimes used for side-payments to induce participation in a multilat-
eral effort, they may also be used to escape them. The “article 98” bilateral
agreements into which the United States has entered to ensure immunity for
American personnel from ICC jurisdiction199 or Australia’s withdrawal from
UNCLOS jurisdiction prior to its bilateral negotiation over maritime
boundaries and gas and oil reserves with East Timor200 provide compelling
examples. The legislation of the American Service-Members’ Protection
Act,201 which ordered the U.S. president to impose sanctions on countries
that participate in the ICC, is an even blunter instance of the use of a bilat-
eral (or unilateral) route to inhibit a multilateral effort.
Moreover, a practice of striking bilateral package deals that afford special
compensation for better human rights behavior (or any other global value)
runs the risk of encouraging states to hold out on multilateral commitments
with the attempt to extort additional compensation for such commitments
bilaterally. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its demands
for American commitments as condition for reentry is a case in point.202
A fifth type of interaction occurs when rules derived from a variety of
multilateral instruments overlap, requiring a bilateral agreement to choose
one to govern the bilateral relationship. For example, water-allocation trea-
ties, especially before the conclusion of the 1997 Framework Agreement on
International Watercourses, had to select one of four different customary
197. See Carlos Mar´ ıa Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84
BULL. OF THE WTO, 399, 399–404 (2006).
198. The United States-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Statement and Annex, Jan. 14, 1994, available at
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Trilateral.shtml.
199. See U.S. Department of State, Article 98 Agreements and the International Criminal Court,
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/art98/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
200. See Joint News Release, Att’y Gen. Williams and Minister for Foreign Affairs Downer, Changes
to International Dispute Resolution (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/
releases/2002/fa039j_02.html (declaring that Australia’s withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ was based on the principle that maritime boundary disputes were best settled through negotia-
tion and suggesting the possibility of upcoming negotiations over Australia’s maritime border with East
Timor).
201. American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421–31 (2004).
202. For more information on North Korea’s withdrawal, see U.S. State Dep’t, Background Note:
North Korea, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 52 20-MAY-08 13:29
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rules on the sharing of transboundary watercourses.203 The 1997 Agreement
ultimately favored the principle of joint management but only in vague
terms that still necessitate detailed and elaborate negotiations on any spe-
cific watercourse. Rather than ratifying an unhelpful multilateral treaty, ri-
parian states have mostly chosen instead to conclude hundreds of bilateral
water-sharing agreements.
The need to reconcile competing rules increases when the rules are de-
rived from different subject-area regimes, which are driven by varying goals
and values. Although, strictly in terms of numbers, having more BLTs may
exacerbate the problem of fragmentation and proliferation of competing le-
gal instruments, they are nonetheless useful when there is a need to strike a
balance between conflicting principles and preferences. In particular, BLTs
are expedient in that they can take into account the specific needs and re-
quirements of each country. Because they are tailor-made, BLTs can square
security and human rights, development and protection of intellectual prop-
erty, free trade and labor rights. They can be more creative in the solutions
they offer to similar problems arising under differing circumstances.
A sixth type of interaction occurs where a particular BLT attempts to
amend, override or depart from an MLT. This is not the same as a bilateral
instrument used simply to escape the multilateral undertaking, as in the
earlier mentioned examples of the article 98 agreements or Australia’s with-
drawal from ICJ jurisdiction under the UNCLOS. In this category, a bilat-
eral agreement departs from a multilateral norm in order to accommodate
for values or interests that are recognized universally. A common example
occurs in the peace-justice debate. The current trend in international crimi-
nal law is to oppose all impunity and proscribe all amnesty given to war
criminals, even when the amnesty is agreed upon between the parties to the
conflict. The abundance of scholarship debating the tradeoff between the
ideals of peace and justice204 prompts consideration of bilateral arrangements
that advance peace at the expense of accountability for war crimes, even
though the Rome Statute of the ICC seems to accommodate such a prefer-
ence only narrowly and reluctantly.205 In commenting on the issuance of an
arrest warrant by the ICC against a Ugandan rebel group leader, the head of
Uganda’s parliamentary opposition said, “[t]he ICC has become an impedi-
ment to our efforts. Should we sacrifice our peacemaking process here so
203. These customary rules were absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity (ripa-
rian rights), equitable utilization, and community of interest (joint management). On the international
and domestic law of transboundary water-sharing, see Patricia Wouters, Editor’s Foreword, in INTERNA-
TIONAL W ATER L AW: SELECTED W RITINGS OF P ROFESSOR C HARLES B. BOURNE x,  x–xxvi (Patricia
Wouters ed., 1997).
204. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpo-
litik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 191 (2003); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Crimi-
nal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001).
205. See Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 53(2)(c). It might be argued that despite the text of the R
Rome Statute, prosecutorial discretion is wide enough to encompass consideration of a suspect’s role in
promoting peace and to withhold proceedings against him or her.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 53 20-MAY-08 13:29
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they can test and develop their criminal-justice procedures there at the ICC?
Punishment has to be quite secondary to the goal of resolving this con-
flict.”206 While the Ugandan case does not involve a BLT in the formal
sense, involving an intrastate conflict and negotiations between the govern-
ment and rebel groups, the issue of amnesties to war criminals is bound to
come up in future bilateral peace accords, such as a final status agreement
between Israel and Palestine, raising similar concerns.
Moreover, stringent application of international legal rules without re-
gard for each unique historical, political, and cultural context may be
counter-productive. Flexible accommodation of the particular needs of coun-
tries and the space for creative bilateral schemes should be regarded as a
normative value. A case in point is that of Cyprus and the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”). The ECHR has twice ruled that Turkey had
been violating rights in northern Cyprus, in reference to various treaties.207
The “Annan Plan for Peace,” advanced by the U.N. Secretary General a few
years later, included various provisions that departed from the ECHR’s rul-
ing in order to accommodate Turkish interests. When Cypriots went to the
polls to vote on the Annan Plan, the majority of Greek Cypriots voted
against it. To the extent that the Court’s rulings had any effect on the Greek
Cypriot vote, therefore, they were clearly not an enticement for a negotiated
solution, which would have required the Greeks to accept some of Turkey’s
past actions and interests on the island. Referring to the ongoing peace ne-
gotiations on the island, the ECHR asserted that “inter-communal talks
cannot be invoked in order to legitimate a violation of the [European] Con-
vention [on Human Rights].”208
The Cypriot example calls into question the expediency of resolving deep-
running political, historical, national, and ethnic conflicts through courts.
But it also demonstrates a potentially much graver consequence of increased
multilateral regulation, especially the labeling of additional norms as per-
emptory: the narrowing down of the political space that is necessary for
resolving such conflicts through careful consideration of context-specific cir-
cumstances. Today, the island remains divided and the prospects for peace in
the near future are doubtful.
The aggregate of possible relations I have laid out indicates the top-down
influence of international multilateral law over the conclusion of BLTs. But
it also implies the counter-movement, by which BLTs can operate either in
the absence of any MLT, or by which they may, in time, develop into multi-
lateral international law. In the area of international taxation, for instance,
206. Helena Cobban, Op-Ed., Uganda: When International Justice and Internal Peace Are at Odds, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 24, 2006, at 9 (quoting Morris Ogenga-Latigo). Naturally, one might ask
whether, absent the arrest warrant issued by the ICC, a peace process would have begun at all.
207. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶ 63 (1996); Cyprus v. Turkey,
App. No. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 967, ¶ 18 (2001).
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no universal comprehensive tax treaty has been concluded, since govern-
ments insist on devising their own domestic tax structures to meet different
economic needs. Instead, hundreds of bilateral treaties have established as
many made-to-measure exchanges.
It is possible that allowing states to experiment with different regimes on
a bilateral basis eventually creates a larger pool of arrangements to choose
from, adopt, or modify as necessary, providing for a greater wealth of experi-
ence to draw upon when we come to manage the diversity of international
relationships. Such a diverse fund of arrangements is represented by the
2000 negotiated BITs, which would not have come into being had the
sought-after Multilateral Investment Agreement been concluded. In time,
the accumulation of such BLTs could generate a customary norm or spark
the negotiation of a multilateral treaty. Successful bilateral formulas could
serve as useful precedents and foundations for future MLTs. As earlier noted,
significant portions of modern MLTs on the laws of war are an accumulation
and development of earlier practices and customs, many of which were in-
corporated into bilateral agreements between warring parties.209
But just as multilateralism may constrain the conclusion of further BLTs,
it is also possible for the many varied BLTs to obstruct a multilateral norm
from developing. It is thus doubtful whether the conclusion of a multilateral
agreement on investment is still feasible (or desirable) today, when 2000
varied BITs are already in existence. If it turns out that the bilateral
frameworks have mostly enabled stronger powers to exploit weaker ones in a
significant way, then the lack of a credible alternative in the guise of a
multilateral investment agreement is problematic. In a similar vein, in the
sphere of international trade, bilateral and regional frameworks have been
vilified by the WTO, as well as several international trade scholars, as an
obstacle for more robust multilateralism.210 In this context, too, to evaluate
these concerns we need empirical evidence of the effects of limited trade
structures on international trade along various dimensions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Formal treaties are but one subset of structures in the metropolis of inter-
national law. This article advances a systematic study of the diversity of
form and effect within the compass of treaties: how different treaty struc-
tures operate, when they are particularly useful, and what their drawbacks
might be. It also highlights the need for a better understanding of how
209. For an example of immunity for innocent fishing vessels, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900).
210. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN RE-
GIONAL INTEGRATION 22, 22–49 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993). See generally Paul
Krugman, Is Bilateralism Bad?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 9 (E. Helpman & A. Razin
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types of treaties interact with one another, and how, in their accumulation
and interrelation, they compose the architecture of international lawmaking.
Undoubtedly, ideological visions of our world must affect our preferences
regarding the architecture of lawmaking. The very different world vision of
universalists and unilateralists—of how common and uniform our world
should be, and of how common and uniform it can be—drives each camp
toward opposing choices with regard to broad or narrow partnerships in
international lawmaking.
My working assumption has been that instinctive preferences for regulat-
ing vehicles habitually attendant on a particular ideology can be self-defeat-
ing, and that only a broad positive study, complemented by empirical
testing, can give us the most useful insights on how to promote interna-
tional goals using formal treaties. The Article therefore has examined in
detail how different types of treaties promote different values under various
conditions, showing that knee-jerk ideological preferences sometimes run
the risk of causing their holders to exaggerate or underestimate the costs and
benefits of different forms of regulation. At times, those who aspire for an
international constitution and the embedding of universal norms in univer-
sal regimes may find bilateral treaties surprisingly effective in promoting
these norms, as in the cases of labor standards, environmental protection, or
nonproliferation. In the same way, for those who are concerned about sover-
eignty and freedom of action, multilateral regimes might still prove the
most efficient and effective method of attaining security or economic power,
as in the cases of multilateral regimes governing arms control or the protec-
tion of intellectual property. Oftentimes, far from an either-or choice, it is a
combination of both structures that may produce the most potent
architecture.
In an attempt to fill in the gap in the current mainstream of international
legal thought, the paper began by tracing prevalent claims and expectations
regarding MLTs: the promotion of the rule of law and related values (equal-
ity, uniformity, and normative power); compliance, effectiveness, and effi-
ciency of regimes; and the democratic legitimacy and professionalism
associated with multilateral treaty-making. I demonstrated that many of the
claims about the virtues of MLTs are overstated, that expectations are frus-
trated by the conduct of states in practice, and that the focus on MLTs
blocks our vision from the potential operation of BLTs. All of these observa-
tions call for a more nuanced view of the embedded potential of both MLTs
and BLTs than is offered by current work.
I then argued that the choice between different structures of regulation
must run a gamut of multifaceted considerations, including the type of ac-
tivity to be regulated under a proposed international regime, the necessity of
truly universal cooperation in attaining sought goals, the possible externali-
ties of the behavior or regulation on non-members, the degree to which a
regime seeks to establish universally applicable norms, and the question of\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 56 20-MAY-08 13:29
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whether material differences among countries prohibit uniform arrange-
ments. Power disparities may tip the scale either way—toward or away from
multilateralism—depending on the context. Finally, I discussed how the
workings of MLTs and BLTs in concert either promote or hinder the attain-
ment of international (or domestic) goals.
Throughout the Article, I offered a typology of the workings of different
types of treaties under various circumstances, at times speculating or offer-
ing anecdotal evidence of how these two types of treaties fare in particular
subject areas. This typology would benefit from further empirical investiga-
tion. For example, empirical testing should either affirm or refute the claims
regarding the comparative effects of BLTs and MLTs in different types of
activities or concerning different types of goods, the reinforcing power of
BLTs (such as in the case of labor standards or human rights more gener-
ally), the uses and abuses of power disparities in bilateral negotiations (look-
ing, for instance, at FTAs and BITs), the extent to which MLTs inform the
negotiation and conclusion of BLTs in the same sphere, or the degree to
which BLTs obstruct the creation of broad-based multilateral regimes. An-
other empirical avenue would be to test the degree of involvement of domes-
tic and international civil society in the negotiation and conclusion of
different forms of treaties. Such empirical work would test existing claims
about democratic legitimacy, transparency, and popular participation as well
as my own claim that BLT-making is too often under the radar screen of
international actors despite the BLT’s relevance to and impact on values dear
to those actors.
My assessment has remained internal to the world of bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties. It explored the operation of two types of treaties in compari-
son with one another but not vis-` a-vis other alternatives such as customary
norms, general principles, soft-law mechanisms or individual self-regulation,
or even LMLTs. One question that remains implicit in this discussion and
that warrants concern is whether the metropolis of international law, with
its host of formal forms of regulation, is crowding out the operation of polit-
ics, diplomacy, even power. This question becomes acute where treaties pur-
port to prescribe jus cogens norms, allowing no reservations, derogations
from, or conflict with their provisions. We must keep in mind that the
moral and ethical tenets of the international community, inasmuch as they
are cohesive, are not frozen. Norms change and specifically devised provi-
sions may come, in time, to be regarded as degenerate. The legitimacy and
lawfulness of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which mandated the ethnic
transfer of nearly two million people between Greece and Turkey,211 would
be widely rejected today even though the architect of the scheme, Dr.
Fridtjof Nansen, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. One may equally im-
211. British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Turkey, Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28
L.N.T.S. 11 (1924); Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Lausanne),
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agine that the non-recognition of an “economic refugee” status would come,
in the none-too-distant future, to be viewed as a moral aberration by future
generations.
It is therefore abundantly clear that international law must retain a mea-
sure of adaptability as well as variegation. For this reason, among others, the
role of BLTs as a source of international law and a tool of international
relations should be restored from its currently neglected place in interna-
tional law scholarship. Hopefully, an increased scholarly interest in bilateral
behavior might also induce international actors to pay greater attention to
what governments are in fact doing bilaterally.\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 58 20-MAY-08 13:29